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THE PROHIBITION OF  
RAPE IN INTERNATIONAL  
HUMANITARIAN LAW AS A NORM OF JUS 
COGENS: CLARIFYING THE DOCTRINE 
DAVID S. MITCHELL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“In the law, it is not the obvious that needs be specified, but the 
ambiguous that must be clarified.”1 
 
The recent abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers at Abu 
Ghraib prison, including sexual violence and torture, shocked the 
public conscience.2  Photographs appearing on the front page of every 
major news source in the world vividly depicted a pattern of system-
atic, sexualized abuse that wrenched the private horrors of war into 
the public sphere.3  Yet these images represent nothing new: rape, 
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 1. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 369 (1999). 
 2. Ian Fisher, Iraqi Tells of U.S. Abuse, from Ridicule to Rape, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2004, 
at A8; Robert Fisk, The Destruction of Morality, INDEP. (London), May 7, 2004, at 1; Iraq: 
America's Shame, GUARDIAN (London), May 1, 2004, at 25; David Scheffer, The Legal Double 
Standards of Bush's War, FIN. TIMES, May 6, 2004, at 21; Julian Borger, U.S. Soldiers Face Ac-
tion Over Abuse Charges, HINDU, May 1, 2004, at 1. Methods of abuse at Abu Ghraib included 
forcing prisoners to masturbate publicly, forced sexual acts between male prisoners, stripping 
prisoners naked and binding them together, beating and urinating on prisoners, and chaining 
prisoners naked to the bars of their cells.  Fischer, supra; Iraq: America's Shame, supra. Rape 
was also used as a threat to elicit confessions. Fisher, supra.  It is important to note how torture 
often has a sexualized component.  See Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW 
YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42, 43–44 (describing instances of torture and sexual abuse that were 
especially dehumanizing to those of Islamic faith). 
 3. Kelly D. Askin, The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 509, 512 (2003) (noting how "wartime violence has deliberately become sexualized as a means 
of inflicting physical or mental harm on members of the opposition group"). Sexual violence has 
two functions in war: (1) as a means to demoralize the opposition; and (2) as a reward for com-
batants, to entertain, energize, and galvanize troops.  Id. at 512.  While sexual violence was once 
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torture, and sexual violence have been endemic during armed conflict 
for centuries.4  Rather, “what is new is the role of the media.  Instant 
reporting from the field has resulted in [the] rapid sensitization of 
public opinion . . . [to] make some kind of action a moral impera-
tive.”5  Indeed, the paradox of violent conflict is that it promotes the 
 
considered an inevitable byproduct of war, "it is now recognized that women and girls are regu-
larly and intentionally targeted for abuse, particularly sexual abuse."  Id. at 509.  To be sure, 
rape and other forms of sexual violence are also committed against men, albeit on a much 
smaller scale. ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN, infra note 5, at 95.  For instance, the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib were carried out almost exclusively against men, in order to dominate, 
control, and emasculate Iraqi prisoners.  See supra note 2, and accompanying texts.  However, 
for the purposes of this article, discussion will focus primarily on sexual violence committed 
against women because of the disproportionate number of gender-related crimes experienced 
by women in war and the unique after-effects of rape experienced by women that are not shared 
by men (though the analysis should be applied to sexual crimes against men as well).  Askin, 
supra note 3, at 512.  See Harry van Tienhoven, Sexual Violence: A Method of Torture Also Used 
Against Male Victims, in III International Conference: 'Health, Political, Repression and Human 
Rights,' ACTAS PROCEEDINGS, 24-29 Nov. 1991, at 393–95. 
 4. See generally infra notes 5–12 and accompanying texts (establishing the long history or 
rape, torture, and sexual violence during armed conflict). 
 5. Theodor Meron, Comment, Rape As A Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 
87 AM. J. INT'L LAW 424, 424 (1993) [hereinafter Meron, Rape as a Crime] (observing that 
"[b]ecause the international community has failed in the central task of ending the bloodshed 
and atrocities, the establishment of the tribunal has become the preferred means to promote 
justice and effectiveness of international law").  For a more detailed discussion of the history of 
rape in war and the failure of nations to prosecute wartime rape, see Theodor Meron, Shake-
speare's Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, 86 AM. J. INT'L LAW 1, 29–30 (1992) (observing 
that, though prohibited by King Henry, rape was considered an incentive for soldiers involved in 
siege warfare during the Hundred Years War) [hereinafter Meron, Henry the Fifth]; HILARY 
CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
FEMINIST ANALYSIS 252–55 (2000) (chronicling rape and sexual violence during World War II, 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the armed conflict in the Former Yugoslavia); SUSAN 
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 30–115 (1975) (providing ex-
amples of rape during wartime, from ancient Greek and Roman battles, through World War II 
and Vietnam); Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes Against Women 
in Time of War, in MASS RAPE 197 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994) (stating that the rape of 
women during war has historically been "comfortably cabined as a mere inevitable 'by-product 
of war'"); Kathleen M. Pratt & Laurel E. Fletcher, Time for Justice: The Case for the Interna-
tional Prosecutions of Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S L. J. 77, 80–82 (1994) (finding that, despite being globally pervasive, rape and gender-
based violence do not receive the same attention as other international law violations, either 
through prosecution or in U.N. investigation and reporting); Rosalind Dixon, Rape as a Crime in 
International Humanitarian Law: Where to from Here? 13 EJIL 697, 698-705 (2002) (suggesting 
that recent prosecutions of sexual violence remain inadequate and that "the potential to recog-
nize the specific gendered harms suffered by the victims of war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity is inherently limited within the international criminal process"); see generally KELLY 
DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WAR 
CRIMES TRIBUNALS (1997) [hereinafter ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN] (providing an 
exhaustive historical analysis of gender specific war crimes and the development of gender 
crimes in customary international law); YOUGINDRA KHUSHALANI, DIGNITY AND HONOUR OF 
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possibility of advancing the very human rights that were denied in 
conduct, such that the visible perpetration of atrocities often leads to 
the development and expression of the symbolic and regulative func-
tions of international law—precedents of accountability arising from 
the production of law to generate post-conflict peace building and 
long-term deterrence—and the international criminalization of its 
most serious breaches.6  In this way, we traditionally think of a very 
ordered and gratifying connection between violence and the produc-
tion of law.7  And yet, as the images from Abu Ghraib show, that rela-
tionship is anything but direct, particularly when the violence is sexu-
alized.  What happens when the sources of violence are also 
responsible for administering justice and defining order?  To what ex-
tent is the relationship between atrocities and law disturbed when the 
crimes involve sexual violence?  How does the treatment of rape as a 
sexual crime rather than a violent8 crime complicate regulation and in-
 
WOMEN AS BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1982) (providing a detailed history 
and critical analysis of documents protecting the rights of women during armed conflict); Cath-
erine N. Niarchos, Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing The International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 649 (1995) (noting the rape of civilian women in the for-
mer Yugoslavia and other armed conflicts throughout history, the gender-biased status of rape 
in international humanitarian law, and the challenges of prosecuting rape before the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and 
Other Gender-Related Crimes Under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Ob-
stacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 288 (2003) [hereinafter Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape] (ob-
serving centuries of disregard in the development of international humanitarian law regarding 
women, but also noting extraordinary progress in this area of law since World War II—
particularly the jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC). 
 6. Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 5, at 424.  Meron goes on to note that, 
Nazi atrocities, for example, led to the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal; the 
evolution of the concepts of crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and the 
crime of genocide; the shaping of the fourth Geneva Convention; and the birth of the 
human rights movement. The starvation of Somali children prompted the Security 
Council to apply chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to an essentially internal situation, 
bringing about a revolutionary change in our conception of the authority of the United 
Nations to enforce peace in such situations . . . [additionally] it took the repeated and 
massive atrocities in former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to persuade 
the Security Council that the commission of those atrocities constitutes a threat to in-
ternational peace, and that the creation of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal 
would contribute to the restoration of peace. 
Id.  See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Law in the Process 
of International Protection of Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 193, 193 (1982) (stat-
ing that "[r]esort to criminal proscription is a compelled when a given right encounters an 'en-
forcement crisis' in which other modalities of protection appear inadequate"). 
 7. Bassiouni, id. at 193; Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 5, at 424 ("It is a pity that ca-
lamitous circumstances are needed to shock the public conscience into focusing on important, 
but neglected areas of law . . . [t]he more offensive the occurrence, the greater the pressure for 
rapid adjustment"). 
 8. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 345 n.246 (observing that "[v]iolent crimes are viewed gen-
erally as more serious than crimes to property or nonviolent crimes.  The violence inherent in 
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ternational obligation?  The events at Abu Ghraib bring to light a 
number of issues that make it a relevant time to consider such ques-
tions, and to that end, this article examines the current status and le-
gal value of sexual violence as a crime in international humanitarian 
law. 
In the last decade, the international community has witnessed 
atrocities of sexual violence on an unimaginable scale.9  Abuses in 
Rwanda,10 the former Yugoslavia,11 Sierra Leone,12 and the recent ex-
 
rape is often difficult to detect . . . [t]hus rape and sexual assault are often referred to as crimes 
of 'honour,' which do not sound as serious . . . [and] obscures the fact that rape and sexual as-
sault are violent crimes which cause lasting physical and psychological harm"). 
 9. Sexual violence is commonplace in international and internal armed conflict.  See U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Mission to Indonesia and East Timor on the 
Issue of Violence Against Women (20 November-4 December 1998), U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on 
Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 12(a), paras. 9, 93–98, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.3 
(1999) (providing case examples of large-scale sexual violence by the Indonesian army during 
counter-insurgency operations during 1989-1993); Seth Mydans, Sexual Violence as a Tool of 
War: Pattern Emerging in East Timor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2001, at A1 (describing "dozens, 
even hundreds of rapes," during violence in East Timor in 1999); SURVIVORS' RIGHTS 
INTERNATIONAL & WOMEN'S ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN, 
JOINT REPORT: SEVERE PERSECUTION AND VIOLENCE UNDER THE TALIBAN'S VEIL: WAR 
AGAINST WOMEN AS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 2 (2002) (stating that women were specifi-
cally targeted for various brutal crimes, including rape, under Taliban rule of Afghanistan ); 
JOANNE CSETE & JULIANE KIPPENBERG, THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR: SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS IN EASTERN CONGO 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/Congo0602.pdf (describing sexual violence as "a weapon of 
war" used by most of the forces involved in armed conflict in Congo); Rape in Haiti: a Weapon 
of Terror, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 8 (July 1994) (citing numerous reports detailing rape dur-
ing conflict in Haiti in the early 1990s); Martina Vandenberg & Kelly Askin, Chechnya: Another 
Battleground for the Perpetration of Gender Based Crimes, 2 HUM. RTS. REV. 140, 141-143 
(2001) (detailing witness accounts of rape during 1999 conflict in Chechnya); Marie Colvin, 
Saddam Blackmails Rebels With Rape, SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), July 9, 2000 (describing Saddam 
Hussein's practice of using rape of female family members as a method of "keep[ing] his people 
under control or threaten[ing] his enemies); See Kelly Askin, supra note 3, at 509, 509 citing 
JUDITH G. GARDAM & MICHELLE J. JARVIS, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (2001) (describing wartime rape in Aceh, Afghanistan, Algeria, An-
gola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Bougainville, Chad, Chechnya, Croatia, Cyprus, East Timor, Georgia, 
Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Irian Jaya, Kashmir, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Myan-
mar (Burma), Namibia, Palestine territories, Persian Gulf Conflict (1990–91), Peru, Philippines, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa during the apartheid, Sudan, Tibet, Uganda, and 
West Papua). 
 10. See generally Binaifer Nowrojee, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwanda 
Genocide and Its Aftermath, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH  (AFRICA DIVISION) (Sept. 1996), avail-
able at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm (noting the extremely widespread abuse of 
women during the Rwandan genocide: "[R]ape and other forms of violence were directed pri-
marily against Tutsi women on the basis of their gender and ethnicity").  Id. at 1. 
 11. Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces 
(Jan. 1993). 
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posure of the mass rape and sexual enslavement of some 200,000 so-
called “comfort women” by Japanese military personnel during 
World War II13 clearly placed the issue of sexual violence on the in-
ternational agenda and have subsequently led to a growing recogni-
tion of the importance of prohibiting crimes of sexual violence, in-
cluding rape, such that these crimes have been given a special 
normative character in the international legal system.  Historically, 
rape and other crimes of sexual violence have received little attention 
in international law and, until recently, the failure of humanitarian 
law instruments to adequately incorporate,14 characterize, or even 
 
 12. Louise Taylor, "We'll Kill You If You Cry": Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone 
Conflict, 15 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (AFRICA DIVISION) 1(A) (Jan. 2003), at 6-8, 28-63, 76-7, 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sierraleone/ (describing how extreme sexual 
violence was used systematically throughout the Sierra Leone conflict to terrorize, humiliate, 
and punish thousands of women of all ages, including very young girls, on the basis of their 
gender); See generally Corinne Dufka, Sierra Leone: Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and 
Rape, 11 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (AFRICA DIVISION) 3(A) (June 1999), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sieraa/; Physicians for Human Rights, War-Related Sexual 
Violence in Sierra Leone: A Population-based Assessment (Boston: Physicians for Hum. Rts 
2002) [hereinafter Physicians for Human Rights], available at http://www.phrusa.org/research/ 
sierraleone/report.html; Scott Campbell & Jane Lowicki, Sierra Leone: Sowing Terror: 
Atrocities Against Civilians in Sierra Leone, 10 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (AFRICA DIVISION) 
3(A) (July 1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/sierra/Sier988-01.htm#P88_2258.  In 
the Sierra Leone conflict from March 1991 to 2001, more than half of all women and girls, or as 
many as 215,000-257,000, suffered some form of sexual violence.  See Physicians for Human 
Rights, id., at 2–4 (describing the extraordinary level of brutal human rights abuses during the 
decade long conflict in Sierra Leone, including sexual violence against women and girls). 
 13. Update to the Final Report on Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual 
Slavery and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts, 
52nd Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 6, paras. 71–78, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/2000/21 (2000). 
 14. Instead, crimes against women have been traditionally defined and prosecuted along-
side or "folded into" other atrocities, which tends to "subsume the incidence of sexual violence 
and prevent it from receiving the individual condemnation from which it would benefit." Han-
nah Pearce, An Examination of the International Understanding of Political Rape and the Sig-
nificance of Labeling it Torture, 17 INT'L. J. REF. L. 534, 544–45 (2003).  See also Niarchos, supra 
note 5, at 665 (discussing how rape does not appear anywhere in the 179 page judgment of the 
IMT at Nuremberg); Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8 1945, art. 6(b), 59 
Stat. 1546, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S 279 [hereinafter London Charter] (listing war crimes coming within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, of which rape is not included). Notably, the indexes of the Nur-
emberg proceedings included 31/2 pages for the crime "looting," while the headings "rape," 
"prostitution," or even "women," are not included at all.  ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST 
WOMEN, supra note 5, at 98 (citing TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 14 Nov. 1945—1 Oct. 1946 (42 Vols., 1947) [hereinafter 
IMT Docs], at Vol. XXIII (providing a 732-page chronological and subject matter index that 
fails to mention gender crimes)).  Although the London Charter and the Tokyo Charter fail to 
explicitly list rape and sexual assault as war crimes, both documents implicitly refer to them as 
such under the term "ill treatment." BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 348.  As a result, rape was not 
prosecuted as a war crime at Nuremberg under customary international law, but it was, how-
ever, prosecuted in Tokyo—though these prosecutions were viewed as ancillary to other war 
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mention rape and sexual assault has downplayed crimes against 
women as the unfortunate but inevitable byproduct of war.15  Indeed, 
the Lieber Instructions (1863)—the first codification of customary in-
ternational laws of land warfare and an important influence on the 
modern law of war—classified rape as a crime of “troop discipline,” 
and the current applicable law regarding war contained within the 
Nuremberg Charter, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977 
Additional Protocols contain a number of shortcomings and contra-
dictions with respect to defining sexual violence as a serious interna-
tional offense.16  As Askin notes, “it is only recently that the interna-
tional community is beginning to grasp the moral, social, economic, 
and legal importance of taking adequate measures to prevent and 
punish gender crimes.”17  Yet despite these shortcomings, the legal 
 
crimes. See id.; See also, ASKIN, id. at 378 (noting that "in the Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals, 
abuses against women were never adequately reported, investigated, or prosecuted"). 
 15. United Nations, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, Final Report submitted by Ms. 
Grac'a Machel, expert of the Secretary-General, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 
48/157, A/51/306 of 26 August 1996, at 22, para. 91 (stating that "while abuses such as murder 
and torture have long been denounced as war crimes, rape has been downplayed as an unfortu-
nate but inevitable side effect of war"). 
 16. See e.g., supra note 5 and accompanying text (supporting the global prevalence of the 
use of rape during war and the failure to prosecute); Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra 
note 5, at 294-296 (discussing the inadequacy of international humanitarian law instruments—
such as the Hague Conventions, Nuremberg Charter, 1949 Geneva Conventions, and 1977 Ad-
ditional Protocols—with regard to protecting women, Askin argues, "[w]omen and girls have 
habitually been sexually violated during wartime, yet even in the twenty-first century, the 
documents regulating armed conflict either minimally incorporate, inappropriately characterize, 
or wholly fail to mention these crimes"). See generally Lieber Code, infra note 58; IMT Docs, 
supra note 14; Geneva Convention IV, infra notes 68-70; Additional Protocol I & II, infra note 
71-72.  For a feminist analysis of jus cogens, see Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The 
Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 65 (1993) (arguing that jus cogens is gender biased 
and does not reflect equally on women and men by asserting male-oriented values and mascu-
line interpretations of international law); see also Hilary Charlesworth, Symposium on Method: 
Feminist Methods, 93 AM J. INT'L L. 379, 386–871 (1999) (noting that "the provisions on rape [in 
the Geneva Convention] are not specifically included in the category of grave breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law"); Hilary Charlesworth, et. al., Feminist Approach to International 
Law, 85 AM J. INT'L L. 613, 627–29 (1991) (arguing that the definition of torture in international 
law does not include many instances of brutality and sexual violence against women—deeming 
them "private" crimes and thus beyond the reach of international law); Judith Gardam, A 
Feminist Analysis of Certain Aspects of International Humanitarian Law, 12 AUST. Y.B. INT'L L. 
265, 267 (1992) (arguing that international humanitarian law is a gendered legal regime); Mark 
A. Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the Women of Afghanistan, 
42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 349, 363 (2004) (noting that local contours affect legitimacy of 
international justice initiatives for women who are victims of gender crimes). 
 17. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 5, at 298 (noting that "the international 
community has been even slower in providing other forms of accountability to victims of sex 
crimes"); Askin, supra note 3, at 520 (observing that "[d]espite its insidious prevalence during 
armed conflict, even the most notorious or egregious cases of sexual violence are typically 
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value of rape as a crime in humanitarian law has progressed remarka-
bly.  Over the last ten years, the extraordinary developments in gen-
der jurisprudence ushered in by the ad hoc Tribunals and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) reflect the international community’s 
willingness to combat and redress crimes of sexual violence as a spe-
cific means of warfare,18 and there is now a strong indication that such 
crimes constitute jus cogens.19 
This article argues that the prohibition of sexual violence in hu-
manitarian law has emerged as one of the most fundamental stan-
dards of the international community as a norm of jus cogens.  Al-
though the prohibition of rape has not been formally designated as a 
jus cogens rule by courts, its peremptory status, like that of torture, is 
likely to become an important normative standard within the interna-
tional legal system.  Part II of this article elucidates the criteria for es-
tablishing a rule of jus cogens.  Part III argues that state law and prac-
tice, international conventions, and the decisions of international and 
regional judicial bodies present compelling evidence of a demonstra-
ble and legitimate jus cogens norm barring rape and sexual violence 
under international humanitarian law.  Thus in doing so, this article 
hopes to rethink the doctrine of jus cogens by clarifying the ambigu-
ous legal status of rape. 
For the purposes of this article, the term ‘sexual violence'’ is de-
fined as “any violence, physical or psychological, carried out through 
sexual means or by targeting sexuality”20 and embraces “all serious 
 
committed with absolute impunity . . . an overwhelming majority of perpetrators or facilitators 
of sexual violence are not held accountable for their crimes and few survivors ever receive jus-
tice or any other form of accountability or reparation, much less medical, psychological, or fi-
nancial redress"). 
 18. Many forms of sexual violence have been found to constitute forms of genocide, tor-
ture, slavery, war crimes and crimes against humanity and, when they meet the constituent ele-
ments of these crimes, they may be prosecuted as peremptory norms subject to universal juris-
diction. See ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 5, at 375; Askin, Prosecuting 
Wartime Rape, supra note 5, at 349; infra Part III, Section C. 
 19. ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN, id. at 242 (noting that "[i]nternational trea-
ties, documents, and U.N. resolutions serve as an indication of the direction international law is 
heading regarding fundamental norms of international law. The greatly increased activity in in-
ternational law in the 1990s towards affording greater protection, status, and equality to women 
evidences a universal trend toward jus cogens status for gender based abuses, particularly vio-
lence"). 
 20. United Nations, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and 
Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict, Final Report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, 
Special Rapporteur, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, at 7–8 [hereinafter Contemporary Slavery] (citing M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, Sexual Violence: An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia, Occa-
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abuses of a sexual nature inflicted upon the physical and moral integ-
rity of a person by means of coercion, threat of force or intimidation 
in a way that is degrading and humiliating for the victim’s dignity.”21  
This includes not only the explicit commission of sexual violence by 
an individual, but also the conspiring, ordering, inducing, or aiding 
and abetting in the perpetration of such acts in times of both conflict 
and peace.22 
Rape is an indefensible act.  It is hard to imagine a situation 
where an ordinary rule of international law would permit rape under 
any circumstances, and purely by this logic rape evinces the non-
derogable character necessary for establishing a principle of jus co-
gens.  Indeed, the argument that rape should not be treated as a jus 
cogens principle inevitably “force[s] one to make an inhumane, al-
most barbaric argument regarding why rape should not be expressly 
prohibited in all situations.”23  Moreover, the importance that states 
attach to the eradication of rape has led to a general body of domes-
tic, treaty, and customary law rules that evidence its jus cogens 
status.24  Rape is prohibited in every major domestic legal system, is 
universally included as a component of every other jus cogens norm, 
and has long been a violation of customary international law.25  And 
yet, while rape is often treated as jus cogens, its prohibition is rarely 
enforced and the proliferation of violence against women continues 
to thrive with remarkable impunity.26  Women’s lives remain under-
 
sional Paper No. 1, at 3, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University College 
of Law (1996)). 
 21. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1-T, 73, para. 186 (International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/ 
trialc2/judgement/index.htm. 
 22. See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, adopted by the U.N. 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court on 17 July 1998, art. 25, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 23. James R. McHenry III, The Prosecution of Rape Under International Law: Justice That 
Is Long Overdue, 35 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1269, 1309 (2002) (calling for the establishment of an 
inviolable jus cogens principle against rape). 
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 348 (arguing that "Rape has long been considered a 
war crime under customary international law. . . ."); Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 5, at 
425 ("Rape by soldiers has of course been prohibited by the law of war for centuries"); infra 
note 118 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Amnesty International, It's in Our Hands: Stop Violence Against Women 
[hereinafter Amnesty International, It's in Our Hands], at 2, available at http://web.amnesty.org/ 
actforwomen/reports-index-eng (noting that violence against women is prevalent across the 
world and that power structures which perpetuate such violence are rooted deep within varying 
societies); Alex Duval Smith, Amnesty says violence on women is as great an evil as terrorism, 
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valued such that the application of gender law at the international 
level continues to be limited and selective, and the persistence and 
proliferation of gender violence remains insufficiently addressed.27  
This gap between treatment and recognition results from the failure 
to clearly define rape as a serious international crime on its own 
merit.  Part III attempts to clarify this ambiguity and argues that the 
legal value prohibiting rape expressly places it among the interna-
tional community’s highest crimes as jus cogens.  First, however, the 
criteria for identifying a jus cogens norm must be established. 
 
INDEP., Mar. 6, 2004, at 32 (noting that in the United States "[a] women is raped every 90 
seconds; four women die each day as a result of violence in the family," in Sierra Leone "[m]ore 
than half of all women suffered sexual violence during the 1999 conflict," in Egypt "97 percent 
of married women aged 15 to 49 had female genital mutilation," and in Pakistan "[a]t least a 
thousand women a year die in 'honour' killings"); Somini Sengupta, Relentless Attacks on 
Women In West Sudan Draw an Outcry, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at A1 (reporting that crimes 
often go unreported to officials due to fear and distrust, compounded by a lack of legal 
protection following the report). 
 27. See United Nations, Preliminary Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Vio-
lence Against Women E/CN.4/1995/42 (1995), p.64 (noting that rape "remains the least con-
demned war crime" despite being commonplace during armed conflict). The law of war has 
prohibited rape and other forms of sexual violence for centuries. Under international law, sex-
ual violence can be prosecuted as crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, torture, and as 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Sexual violence may also be prosecuted under uni-
versal jurisdiction as a constituent element of the above crimes, which have attained jus cogens 
status with entailed ergo omnes obligations for all nations to prosecute or extradite alleged of-
fenders whom they find on their territory. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 348 (supporting that the 
law of war has prohibited rape for centuries). And yet, gender violence remains insufficiently 
addressed in international law due to the gap between state practice and recognition: "Rape has 
been prohibited under IHL through many wars, but the prohibition has been largely ignored or 
unenforced. This dismal state of affairs results from the interplay of two systems. One is a legal 
system that tends to overlook or dismiss women's pain; the other is a war system in which rape 
is an effective weapon. Both systems reveal themselves as male-dominated, with little regard for 
the rights of women."  Niarchos, supra note 5, at 689.  In Part III, infra, I argue that rape has 
risen to the level of a jus cogens norm as an international crime in its own right on the basis that 
it is included in every other peremptory norm, but that the failure to clarify rape as a serious 
violent crime allows such crimes to go unpunished and makes options of redress difficult to use 
in the current international legal system.  Indeed, the jus cogens status of rape presents a para-
dox: In theory, gender violence has risen to the level of jus cogens through its inclusion as a 
component of every other jus cogens norm, and its prohibition in customary international law 
and domestic law systems.  Yet, in practice, states have failed to effectively prosecute gender-
based crimes.  This paradox results, I argue, from the failure to clarify the ambiguous legal lan-
guage surrounding rape as a high-level international crime. See infra Part III, IV. 
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II.  THE NORMATIVE  
DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTION OF JUS COGENS 
Jus cogens means compelling or higher law.28  The jus cogens doc-
trine defines peremptory norms from which no derogation is permit-
ted and is “essentially a label placed on a principle whose perceived 
importance, based on certain values and interests, rises to a level that 
is acknowledged to be superior to another principle, norm or rule and 
thus overrides it.”29  Drafted in 1969, Article 53 of The Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties formally defines the international le-
gal principle of jus cogens: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of 
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no deroga-
tion is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent 
norm of general international law having the same character.30 
Peremptory norms represent the top of the international legal hierar-
chy and take precedence over national law at the international level 
and other sources of international law.  They protect the most com-
pelling and essential interests of the international community as a 
whole and invalidate treaty law and other ‘ordinary’ rules of custom-
ary international law not endowed with the same normative force.31  
 
 28. M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to "General Principles of International 
Law," 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 768, 801 (1989-1990) ("The very words 'jus cogens' mean 'the com-
pelling law' and, as such, a jus cogens principle holds the highest position in the hierarchy of all 
other norms, rules, and principles. It is because of that standing that jus cogens principles have 
come to be known as 'peremptory norms'"); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under 
International Law, 66 TEX L. REV. 785, 829–31 (1988) (discussing the history of universal juris-
diction).  Please note that I will use the terms 'peremptory' and 'jus cogens' interchangeably. 
 29. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 210. 
 30. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
344 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 31. Although the notion of jus cogens was originally conceived at the Vienna Convention 
as a restriction on state action from violating the interests of the community of states through 
international agreements thereof, the principle has expanded to include both unilateral state 
and individual action based on the compelling importance of the rights and values embodied in 
jus cogens and the reprehensibility of specific crimes sufficient to shock the public conscience. 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702, 
cmt. n (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (declaring that the human rights norms 
prohibiting genocide, slavery, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic 
racial discrimination as state policy constitute peremptory norms).  See Theodor Meron, On a 
Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.1, 14, 19–20 (1986) (arguing that jus 
cogens must prohibit illegitimate action undertaken by treaty but also by unilateral state action); 
Weller, infra note 36, at 693 (observing that "through the doctrine of universality, all perpetra-
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Crucially, a peremptory norm permits no derogation and “supersedes 
the principle of national sovereignty,”32 thereby creating a deterrent 
effect against contrary state practice that shapes and limits the legisla-
tive powers of sovereign nation-states with respect to the given prin-
ciple. 
As a result of its universal character and nonderogability, a rule 
of jus cogens creates state responsibility erga omnes.33  Put differently, 
 
tors of violations against certain core rules [jus cogens] are threatened, directly under interna-
tional law, with individual criminal responsibility for their conduct"). 
 32. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 213. The notion of binding law derives from natural law 
foundations and is in direct opposition to an international legal order premised on state consent. 
For discussion surrounding the validity of jus cogens as a normative doctrine, see L. 
HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 723–24 (1988) (suggesting that while the "clarifi-
cation of . . . jus cogens in international law is advancing . . . the international community of 
states has been inactive in stating expressly which norms it recognizes as peremptory . . . this in-
activity, and the consequent uncertainty as to which norms are peremptory, constitute at present 
the main problem of the viability of jus cogens").  The scholarly debate surrounding jus cogens 
centers on the existence of a hierarchy of applicable law. For instance, Prosper Weil does not 
see an existent hierarchy and criticizes the doctrine of jus cogens for forcing states to contract 
into rules, even rules they were not prepared to recognize as ordinary norms, without consent.  
Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 423, 
429–30 (1983).  He argues that because the international legal order is primarily a consensual 
system, introducing rules of 'relative normativity' weakens the unity of that system. See id. at 
423–30.  For further views on the topic of jus cogens see Anthony A. D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a 
Plane, It's Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990) (illustrating the ephemeral nature of jus co-
gens and ease with which legal scholars have classify differing ordinary norms as jus cogens); 
Mark W. Janis, Jus Cogens: An Artful Not a Scientific Reality, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 370 (1988) (ar-
guing that jus cogens should be interpreted as international constitutional or natural law); Georg 
Schwarzenberger, International Jus Cogens, 43 TEX. L. REV. 455 (1965) (examining the substan-
tive law supplementing the International Law Commission views of jus cogens); N.G. Onuf and 
Richard K. Birney, Peremptory Norms of International Law: Their Source, Function and Future, 
4 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 187 (1974) (attempting to define the source of jus cogens); JERZY 
SZTUCKI, JUS COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1-5, 97-123 (1972) (presenting a critical analysis of the conventional jus 
cogens concept); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga 
Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 66 (1996) (arguing that the "practice of . . . states evi-
dences that, more often than not, impunity has been allowed for jus cogens crime, the theory of 
universality has been far from being universally recognized and applied, and the duty to prose-
cute or extradite is more inchoate than established, other than when it arises out of specific 
treaty obligations"). 
 33. Id.  In the Barcelona Traction Case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held: 
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards 
the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the 
field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all 
States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a 
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).  For a 
discussion of state responsibility with respect to women's human rights, see generally Rebecca 
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peremptory principles of “compelling law” necessarily impose obliga-
tions of an absolute character “flowing to all” states not to allow im-
punity for such crimes and evoke an international duty to prosecute 
or extradite alleged offenders.34  In this way, peremptory norms iden-
tify the ethical underpinnings of the international system and legally 
obligate states to uphold them.  For some peremptory rules, this rela-
tionship gives rise to universal jurisdiction.35  The universality princi-
 
Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 126 
(1994).    
 34. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 212 (citing the work of the ILC in [1976] 2 Y.B. INT'L 
COMM'N, Part Two, 113; for a discussion of state responsibility, see generally IAN BROWNLIE, 
SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY (1983); FARHAD MALEKIAN, 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES 189 (1985)).  See also Weller, infra 
note 36, at 693 (noting that "all states have a legal interest in compliance with these core [jus 
cogens] rules by all other states (erga omnes effect) . . . .  In relation to such offenses, any state 
can act as an agent of the international constitution and exercise jurisdiction on behalf of the 
international community as a whole").  This duty is requisite in all circumstances based on the 
principles of state responsibility. It follows, therefore, that states may not violate, by treaty or by 
practice, the compelling interests of the global community embodied in jus cogens norms, de-
spite the justifications of state sovereignty.  See e.g., Mark W. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 
CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 362 (1988).  But see Mary E. Turpel & Philippe Sands, Peremptory Inter-
national Law and Sovereignty: Some Questions, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L 364, 365 (1988) (questioning 
Janis' arguments for jus cogens by arguing that jus cogens must necessarily include consideration 
of the traditional notion of sovereignty). 
 35. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PROGRAM IN LAW AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 23 (2001), available at http://www.law.uc.edu/ 
morgan/newsdir/univjuris.html.  Universal jurisdiction attaches to piracy, slavery, war crimes, 
crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture.  Id. at 29.  For instance, 
while the crime of aggression is often recognized as violating jus cogens, it does not attract 
universal jurisdiction. Consider the U.S. campaign against Iraq in 2003 to bring about regime 
change: Iraq refused to consent to binding international legal rules in Security Council 
Resolutions 697 and 1441, prohibiting the development of chemical and biological weapons. 
However, when the U.N. would not authorize the use of force the U.S. went around the 
international legal system and utilized its superior military power to remove Saddam's regime, 
waging a preemptive war of aggression to disarm Iraq without its consent. Yet, the U.S. crime of 
aggression—arguably a violation of a peremptory norm—does not attract universal jurisdiction.  
See generally James Nicholas Boeving, Note, Aggression, International Law, and the ICC: An 
Argument for the Withdrawal of Aggression from the Rome Statute, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 557 (on the crime of aggression in international law in the context of the Iraq war and the 
ICC); Nigel White & Eric Myjer, Editorial, The Use of Force Against Iraq, 8 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 1 (2003) (on the use of force in Iraq); Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security 
Council Failed, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May 1, 2003 (on the role of the Security Council and the use 
of force in an era of the American hyperpower). For a discussion of the general legality of the 
Iraq war, see Peter Ford, As Attack on Iraq Begins, Question Remains: Is It Legal?, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 21, 2003, at 5 (discussing the Iraq invasion as illegal without a U.N. 
mandate, alongside other views); Sean Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 173 (2004) (on the legality of the U.S. invasion of Iraq); Thomas Franck, Humanitarian and 
Other Interventions, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 321, 328 (2005) (comparing NATO's actions 
in Kosovo with the U.S. invasion of Iraq).  Furthermore, the lack of a definition for aggression 
underscores the fact that a number of states consider the use of force to be important in a 
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ple enables any state to arrest and prosecute those who have violated 
certain jus cogens norms36 and is restricted by neither territory nor na-
tionality.37 
Jus cogens norms are notoriously difficult to identify, developing 
over time through the general consensus of the international commu-
nity.38  Although jus cogens is widely acknowledged as a principle of 
international law, there is no agreement on what constitutes the cor-
 
number of circumstances. See generally The Definition of Aggression and the ICC, 96 PROC. AM. 
SOC. INT'L L. 181 (2002). 
 36. Marc Weller, Undoing the Global Constitution: UN Security Council Action on the In-
ternational Criminal Court, 78 INT'L. AFFAIRS 693, 699 (2002) ("Certain types of conduct are 
deemed so harmful to all mankind that any state can exercise jurisdiction in relation to them"). 
 37. There is a trend toward the increased willingness and ability of states to utilize univer-
sal jurisdiction. Recent indictments by national courts exercising universal jurisdiction in the 
UK, Belgium, and the Netherlands show that the principle has gained legal teeth. See M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contem-
porary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 82 (2001) (observing that "[u]niversal jurisdiction has be-
come the preferred technique by those seeking to prevent impunity for international crimes"); 
William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal 
Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 13-20 (observing that "universal jurisdiction is likely 
to play a significant role in the future enforcement of international criminal law"); Weller, supra 
note 36, at 693 (noting that "through the concept of serious breaches of obligations under per-
emptory norms of general international law, the international community as a whole is moving 
towards common action at the state level against violations of these rules"); William J. Aceves, 
Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Uni-
versal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L L. J. 129, 132 (2000) (discussing 
the universalization of transnational law litigation in the context of the Pinochet case and U.S. 
Alien Tort Claims Act); Marc Weller, On the hazards of foreign travel for dictators and other 
international criminals, 75 INT'L AFFAIRS 599, 599–609 (1999) (using the Pinochet case to high-
light the increasing scope of universal jurisdiction); Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Ac-
countability: New Approaches to Past Abuses, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 301, 314-58 (discussing 
the explosive, but uneven development of universal jurisdiction in the context of prosecutions in 
Belgium, Netherlands, the Pinochet cases, and others); see generally Pita J.C. 
Schimmelpenninck van der Oije, A Surinam Crime Before a Dutch Court: Post-Colonial Injus-
tice or Universal Jurisdiction? 24 LEIDEN J. INT'L L 455 (2001) (analyzing the 1982 Amsterdam 
Court's use of universal jurisdiction to prosecute a human rights case); Randall, supra note 27 
(detailing expansion of universal jurisdiction from offenses such as piracy and slave trading to 
war crimes and crimes against humanity); Amnesty International, The Duty of States to Enact 
and Enforce Legislation (2001), at Ch.1-2 (on the history of universal jurisdiction), Ch.3-4 (dis-
cussing war crimes), Ch.5-6 (crimes against humanity), Ch.7-8 (genocide), Ch. 9-10 (torture) 
available at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/legal_memorandum (providing examples of state prac-
tice at the national level and detailing the legal basis for universal jurisdiction for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, torture, genocide, and other crimes).  Importantly, universal jurisdic-
tion derives its force from the special normative character of peremptory norms and the erga 
omnes obligations they entail.  Bassiouni, supra note 32, at 72-4.  If certain conduct can never be 
lawful—such as two states entering into a treaty purporting to commit genocide against indi-
viduals of a third state—it follows that all states should have the legal right to exercise jurisdic-
tion over alleged offenders, especially if it is in the interest of international society to stop such 
conduct. 
 38. See McHenry, supra note 23, at 1309. 
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pus of jus cogens norms.39  Generally speaking, however, such a list 
would presumably include genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, torture, aggression, piracy, and slavery as accepted peremp-
tory norms.40 
In order to become jus cogens, there must be a general norm of 
international law that is recognized and accepted by the international 
community of states as a whole.  As articulated in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), an international 
rule must satisfy the three basic sources of international law: treaty, 
custom, and general principles of law.41  These basic sources of inter-
national law determine “how new rules are made and existing rules 
are repealed or abrogated.”42  International treaties are binding upon 
all parties to them and must be “expressly recognized by the consent-
ing states.”43  In addition, if a treaty is of a fundamentally norm-
creating character and subsequently becomes a rule of custom 
through state practice, it may generate rights and duties for third par-
ties who are not signatories to the convention.44  Customary interna-
tional law is binding upon all states,45 and according to the ICJ Stat-
ute, requires “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”46  As 
defined in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, customary law has 
two essential components: uniform and consistent state practice and 
 
 39. See Meron, supra note 31, at 4 (noting the lack of consensus concerning the content of 
jus cogens norms). 
 40. Bassiouni, supra note 32, at 68 (arguing that sufficient legal basis exists to conclude that 
all of these crimes are part of jus cogens. He cites the following sources: (1) the ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes address genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; (2) the 1996 Code of 
Crimes includes these three crimes plus Aggression.). See Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace 
and Security of Mankind: Titles and Articles on the Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Se-
curity of Mankind adopted by the International Law Commission on its Forty-Eight Session, 
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4L.532 (1996), revised by U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4L.532/Corr.1 and U.N. Doc. A/CN.41.532/Corr.3, arts. 16–20. 
 41. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) art. 38 (1). 
 42. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 5, at 62 (citing A. CASSESE & J. WEILER 
(eds.), CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 1-62 (1988)). 
 43. ICJ STATUTE, art. 38(1)(a). North Sea Continental Shelf Case (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. 
Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J 4, 42 (judgment of Feb. 20) [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf]. 
 44. See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 541 
(1993) (discussing that states and individuals may be bound by jus cogens rules, even without 
explicit consent). 
 45. A persistent objector to a customary rule may be bound by that rule if it constitutes jus 
cogens. Id. 
 46. ICJ STATUTE, art. 38(1)(b). 
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evidence of opinio juris.47  State practice requires that the state con-
sent to the rule in question by engaging in “constant and uniform” 
behavior,48 while opinio juris requires that states have acted out of a 
sense of legal obligation.49  Finally, general principles of international 
law are fundamental rules “recognized by civilized nations,”50 com-
mon to the major legal systems of domestic law, and serve as a secon-
dary source of international law in situations where conventional or 
customary international law is not applicable.51 
In addition to satisfying the basic sources of international law, 
during the drafting of the Vienna Convention some members of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) suggested that a peremptory 
norm could be identified by the following objective indicia: (1) 
whether the norm is incorporated into norm-creating multilateral 
agreements and is prohibited from derogation in those instruments; 
(2) whether a large number of nations have perceived the norm to be 
essential to the international public order, whereby the norm is re-
flected in general custom and is perceived and acted upon as an 
obligatory rule of higher international standing; and (3) whether the 
norm has been recognized and applied by international tribunals, 
such that when violations occur, the norm is treated in practice as a 
 
 47. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J 42, 44 (noting that two conditions must be ful-
filled to evidence opinio juris: (1) the acts concerned must amount to a settled practice; and (2) 
states must believe that the behavior is required by law and amounts to a specific legal obliga-
tion.).  See also Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta) 1985 
I.C.J 29 (Judgment of 3 June) para. 27. 
 48. See Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 7 (Judgment of Nov. 20), reprinted in 
ICJ REPORTS 266, 276 (1950) (noting that the "Columbian Government must prove that the 
rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in 
question" in order to establish a customary rule thereof). 
 49. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J 42, 44 (observing that evidence of opinio juris 
requires that "not only must the acts concerned amount to settled practice, but they must also 
be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is ren-
dered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it"). Acts that evidence opinio juris 
include explicit acts and claims of states in their international relations, national laws and deci-
sions concerning international law questions, communications between states, and collective 
assertions by international organizations such as the U.N. as well as international conventions.  
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 32, at 232. 
 50. ICJ STATUTE, art. 38(1)(c). Also note that "judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations" may be used "as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law." ICJ STATUTE, art. 38(1)(d). 
 51. Importantly, however, one state's domestic law does not bind another state, so before a 
general principle can be concluded it must be shown that the wider international community 
accepts the norm before it can become obligatory to all nations. See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 
32, at 244. 
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jus cogens rule with appropriate consequences ensuing.52  Norms satis-
fying, first, the basic sources of international law as articulated by the 
ICJ and, second, the objective criteria listed above can therefore be 
considered rules of jus cogens.53  In arguing for the addition of rape to 
jus cogens, these criteria will be addressed in turn. 
III.  THE EXISTENCE OF AN  
INVIOLABLE JUS COGENS NORM PROHIBITING RAPE 
The jus cogens nature of a norm barring rape under international 
humanitarian law is evident in a number of sources: 
The landmark jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribu-
nals recognizing [and prosecuting] sexual violence as war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and instruments of genocide [and torture], 
the inclusion of various forms of sexual violence in the ICC Statute 
(including crimes that had never before been formally articulated in 
an international instrument), the increasing attention given to gen-
der violence in international treaties, U.N. documents, and state-
ments by the Secretary-General [and high-level jurists], the new ef-
forts to redress sexual violence in internationalized/hybrid courts 
and by truth and reconciliation commissions, the recent recognition 
of gender crimes by regional human rights bodies, and the increas-
ingly successful claims brought in domestic courts to adjudicate 
gender crimes.54 
 
 52. Kha Q. Nguyen, Note, In Defense of the Child: A Jus Cogens Approach to the Capital 
Punishment of Juveniles in the United States, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 401, 423 (1995) 
(noting that "leading authorities have suggested that a norm is peremptory when: (1) a large 
number of nations recognize it as being essential to the international public order; (2) it is em-
bodied in multilateral agreements prohibiting derogation from the particular norm; and (3) it 
has been applied by international tribunals"); see Summary Records of the 683rd-685th Meetings 
[1963] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 72, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156/Add.1/1963 at 63, 74 (discussing Arti-
cle 13 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: 
Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 592–593 (1988) 
(articulating criteria for jus cogens: (1) whether there are widespread rules and practices in-
grained in the legal conscience of the international community; (2) whether the norm is indis-
pensable to the existence of the public international law system; and (3) whether the norm cre-
ates an objective obligation requiring all states to observe the norm). 
 53. Only a sufficient combination of these elements (national law, customary law amount-
ing to opinio juris, resolutions of international organizations, the jurisprudence of international 
courts, etc.) may evidence the creation of a true peremptory norm. See e.g., HANNIKAINEN, su-
pra note 32, at 723-24. 
 54. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 5, at 349 (observing that this evidence 
"supports the assertion that sexual violence, at the very least rape and sexual slavery, has risen 
to the level of a jus cogens norm"). 
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Furthermore, rape is included as a constituent element of every ac-
cepted peremptory norm.55  Taken together, these sources confirm 
that rape is now considered to be among the most serious interna-
tional crimes by the community of states. 
This section attempts to clarify the ambiguous legal status of rape 
as a crime in international humanitarian law and asserts that its pro-
hibition constitutes jus cogens.  This section also considers the pro-
gression of gender law in the international legal system—outlining ar-
eas of both success and failure—to elucidate the development in 
thinking about such crimes toward their current peremptory status 
and to show why further legal clarification is needed.  It begins with a 
consideration of international conventions and resolutions prohibiting 
rape as a non-derogable legal duty to provide a preliminary founda-
tion for asserting the existence of a general norm of international law.  
Then it presents the law and practice of nations to show that such a 
prohibition is reflected in general custom and is perceived and acted 
upon as an obligatory rule of higher standing.  Finally, it introduces 
decisions by international and regional courts, as well as actions un-
dertaken by the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly in re-
sponse to violations, to show that a customary rule prohibiting rape 
has been recognized and applied in international law. 
A. International Conventions 
The prohibition of sexual violence against women is expressly in-
cluded in a number of multilateral instruments.  The collective force 
of these international conventions, along with a large number of non-
binding international resolutions, is indicative of uniform state prac-
tice and opinio juris and establishes the illegality of rape as a principle 
of customary international law.56 
 
 55. Id. (noting that "[m]any forms of sexual violence constitute forms or instruments of 
genocide, slavery, torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, making them subject to 
universal jurisdiction when they meet the constituent elements of these crimes"). 
 56. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J 42, 176–79 (on the generation of cus-
tomary principles and general norms of international law through "law-making" treaties that are 
widely ratified without broad reservations). 
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Indeed, the law of war has prohibited rape for centuries.57  In 
modern times, the process of codifying customary international laws 
of land warfare begins with the United States Civil War and the draft-
ing of the Lieber Instructions (1863).58  Significantly, the Lieber In-
structions specify rape as a capital crime and clearly mandate that “all 
rape . . . [is] prohibited under the penalty of death.”59  That the first 
codification of the international customary laws of land warfare 
firmly outlaws rape as a serious war crime demanding severe punish-
ment reflects the prohibition of rape as a fundamental law of war 
standard and signifies the strong condemnatory position of customary 
international law with respect to rape committed during war.60  De-
 
 57. Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 5, at 425 ("Rape by soldiers has of course been 
prohibited by the law of war for centuries and violators have been subjected to capital 
punishment under national military codes, such as those of Richard II (1385) and Henry V 
(1419)"). Going back further, in ancient times women were viewed as spoils of war. As Niarchos 
points out, in Homer's The Iliad, his description of the Trojan War shows that women could ex-
pect rape during war:  
So now let no man hurry to sail for home, not yet. . . 
not till he beds down with a faithful Trojan wife, 
payment in full for the groans and shocks of war 
we have all borne for Helen. 
HOMER, THE ILIAD, bk. 2:420–24, at 111 (Robert Fagles trans., 1990); Niarchos, supra note 5, at 
660. 
 58. Francis Lieber, "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field, by Order of the Secretary of War, April 24, 1863," reprinted in FRANCIS LIEBER, 
LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45 (1983). [hereinafter Lieber Code].  The Lieber Code 
is also known as General Orders No. 100.  For a discussion of developments prior to the Lieber 
Code, see BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 41-60, 344-347; Meron, Henry the Fifth, supra note 5, at 
29-30; Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 5, at 425; ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN, 
supra note 5, at 18-35. 
 59. Article 44 of the Lieber Code provides in part: 
All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction 
of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sack-
ing . . . all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing such inhabitants, are prohibited the un-
der penalty of death . . . . 
Id. at art. 44 (emphasis added).  Throughout history, rape has been closely associated with 
crimes of property rather than crimes against the person. Hence the phrase "rape and pillage." 
It is important to note how at this stage rape remains a property crime perpetuated against 
man's honor and that it was rare to find rape reported as a crime against the person. See, e.g., 
ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 5, at 51. 
 60. While the Lieber Code was drafted as the official U.S. Army regulation guide on the 
laws of land warfare for the treatment of civilians, it was derived from international custom and 
usage, and subsequently had a significant impact on the international laws of war. Shortly after 
the Lieber Code was drafted, the characterization of rape as a violent crime was abandoned and 
international documents began to adopt the softer concept of "family honor and rights" as the 
basis for prohibiting rape. Significantly, associations of women with domesticity and the private 
sphere have served to keep violent sexual crimes behind closed doors as secondary crimes, ig-
noring both their seriousness and gender implications. In the wake of the Lieber Code, the 
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parting from the Lieber Instructions, the 1907 Hague Convention 
does not explicitly prohibit rape, but instead provides for the protec-
tion of women under the veiled language of Article 46, which states, 
“family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private prop-
erty . . . must be respected.”61  Broadly considered, Article 46 can be 
taken to cover wartime rape, but in practice it has seldom been inter-
preted in this way.62  Strikingly in this early period, the status of 
women is not addressed directly—wartime rape is limited to a crime 
of troop discipline as an illegal but inevitable occurrence during 
armed conflict—and women are perceived as private objects rather 
than public subjects in law. 
The current applicable law regarding war is contained within the 
Nuremberg Charter, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977 
Additional Protocols.  Unfortunately, the legal definition and status 
of rape is ambiguous in all of these documents.  The London Charter63 
and the Tokyo Charter64 do not mention rape or sexual assault.  As a 
result, rape was not prosecuted at Nuremberg,65 and although it was 
prosecuted at Tokyo, these prosecutions were viewed as ancillary to 
 
euphemism "family honor and rights," as a catchall phrase for the prohibition of rape and sexual 
assault, found itself promulgated in international documents. Along with the Lieber Code, these 
international documents influenced the Hague Peace Conventions of 1899 and 1907 in many 
significant respects. Perhaps most significantly (and unfortunately), the Hague Conventions 
continued the trend of using vague language to express sexual violence. ASKIN, WAR CRIMES 
AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 5, at 35-40; Niarchos, supra note 5, at 672-73. 
 61. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of Regula-
tions, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 46, 36 Stat. 2277, reprinted in 2 MALLOY'S TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, 
INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS 1776-1909, 2269 (1910), [hereinafter 
Hague Convention No. IV]. 
 62. Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 5, at 425.  As the primary regulations of codified 
humanitarian law in effect at the beginning of the First and Second World Wars, the absence of 
explicit language prohibiting rape is regrettable. However, as M. Cherif Bassiouni argues, "the 
general nature of . . . Article [46] should not be taken to mean that it does not prohibit sexual 
violence."  BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 348.  Indeed, many scholars argue that Article 46 could 
have been used to prosecute World War II criminals for sexual assault if the will to prosecute 
had been present.  See BASSIOUNI, id.; ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 5, at 
40. 
 63. London Charter, supra note 13, art. 6(b) (notably, the indexes of the Nuremberg pro-
ceedings included 3.5 pages for the crime "looting," while the headings "rape," "prostitution," 
and "women," are not included at all). IMT Docs, supra note 14. 
 64. Charter for the International Military Tribunal of the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, art. 5(b)–
(c), T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (1968), [hereinafter Tokyo Charter]. 
 65. Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 5, at 425–26 n.13 (although rape was not prose-
cuted at Nuremberg, "In some cases, enforced prostitution was prosecuted in national courts 
outside Germany"). 
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those for other war crimes.66  In contrast, Control Council Law No. 10 
(CCL 10) specifically lists rape as an offense under crimes against 
humanity.67  The Fourth Geneva Convention,68 relating to the protec-
tion of civilian persons during time of war, also prohibits rape and 
forced prostitution under Article 27.69  However, rape and sexual as-
sault are omitted from Article 147, which lists “grave breaches” under 
the Geneva Convention that give rise to universal jurisdiction and ob-
 
 66. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 348.  While rape was not prosecuted separately, the Tokyo 
Tribunal did include rape as a war crime in its indictment. Rape was charged under "inhumane 
treatment," "ill treatment," and "failure to respect family honour and rights," establishing a 
clear precedent for the international prosecution of rape as a war crime.  ASKIN, WAR CRIMES 
AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 5, at 180. 
 67. Adopted by the four occupying powers in Germany, Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL 
10) was established for the trial of war criminals other than those dealt with by the IMT and 
whose crimes had a specific locale.  ASKIN, id. at 121-126.  See e.g., CONTROL COUNCIL FOR 
GERMANY, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1946, at 50, reprinted in NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, 
DOCUMENTS ON PRISONERS OF WAR 304 (International Law Studies vol. 60, Howard S. Levie 
ed., 1979), BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARDS 
WORLD PEACE 488 (1980).  Even though no one was prosecuted in any of the twelve subse-
quent trials under the auspices of CCL 10, it did, however, establish several principles that have 
tremendous implications for the future of gender crimes in international criminal law.  Niarchos, 
supra note 5, at 677.  These implications include: (1) crimes against humanity require proof of 
government participation or conscious approval of systematic procedures "amounting to atroci-
ties and offenses" committed against a "civilian population," so that rape on a wide scale would 
be prosecuted as a crime against humanity, while an isolated case would be prosecuted as a war 
crime; (2) sexually violent crimes committed during peacetime can also be considered crimes 
against humanity; and (3) responsibility is not limited to military personal and liability can in-
clude any persons occupying key positions.  Id. at 677–78 & n.175, citing TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW NO. 10 (1949), United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case), 3 TRIALS UNDER CCL 10. 
 68. Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 74 U.N.T.S. 287, 306. [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
tion IV]. 
 69. Id.  Article 27 provides in part: 
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their 
honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners 
and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected espe-
cially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curi-
osity . . . .  Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in 
particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Yet, importantly, the Fourth Geneva Convention also reflects the pri-
mary inadequacies of international humanitarian law and confirms why rape has not been 
viewed as a serious international crime.  First, the language of the convention is imprecise and 
continues to perpetuate destructive stereotypes by treating rape as a crime against honor.  Vio-
lations of "honor" and "family rights" fail to account for the scale of wartime violence and also 
problematically resurrect the notion that the raped woman is "disgraced."  Second, rape is at-
tached to the wrong category of rights in the Geneva Conventions. Rather than being defined 
under Article 32 expressing violations of physical integrity, rape is included in Article 27—a 
provision viewed as offering protection for "family rights" and not physical integrity of the per-
son.  See Niarchos, supra note 5, at 674. 
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ligate states to pursue and prosecute violations.70  Article 76(1) of 
Additional Protocol I enumerates that “women shall be the object of 
special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, en-
forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault.”71  Article 
4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol II prohibits “outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, en-
forced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.”72  In both of 
these constructions the language expressly prohibits rape, but it does 
so erroneously as a special consideration apart from other violent 
crimes and enforces the gendered need to ‘protect’ women as “the ob-
ject of special respect.”73  This suggests that women are perceived as 
objects of law rather than subjects in law.  Additionally, the language 
limits the scope of rape as a crime committed only against women and 
problematically obscures the fact that men are also victims.  By link-
ing rape with crimes of honor or dignity instead of with crimes of vio-
lence, Additional Protocol II “grossly mischaracterizes the offense, 
perpetuates detrimental stereotypes, and conceals the sexual and vio-
lent nature of the crime.”74 
Given the above considerations, the statutes of the two ad hoc 
Tribunals—the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
 
 70. Article 147 lists the following crimes as grave breaches: 
[W]illful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, including biological experiments, will-
fully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation 
or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected per-
son to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, . . . taking of hostages and extensive de-
struction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried 
out unlawfully and wantonly. 
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 68, art. 147.  While a strong empirical case can be made that 
rape and sexual assault are included in the terms of Article 147 and thus constitute a grave 
breach, the omission indicates that rape and sexual assault are not perceived seriously.  Fur-
thermore, an examination of what the list does include reveals that "destruction of property" 
and "forcing a person to serve in the forces of a hostile power" are considered with more gravity 
than rape. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 350-60 (for a detailed argument of why sexual assault 
and rape clearly fall under "grave breaches"). 
 71. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 76(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
 72. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 4(2)(e), 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Additional Pro-
tocol II]. 
 73. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 68, art. 147 (emphasis added). 
 74. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 5, at 304.  While rape is a violation of 
dignity it is also and primarily a physical assault: "The failure to recognize the violent nature of 
rape is one reason that it has been assigned a secondary status in international humanitarian 
law."  Niarchos, supra note 5, at 675–76. 
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(ICTY)75 and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)76—
reflect an important progression from the historically marginalized 
position of rape in international law by attempting to address the fact 
that gender difference might affect justice and law.77  To be sure, the 
Statutes are contextual and formally applicable only to Rwanda and 
former Yugoslavia, but they do reflect a number of important devel-
opments in this area—particularly the treatment of rape as a specific 
tool of warfare rather than a byproduct of war or as a crime of troop 
discipline—and are quickly becoming normative instruments of the 
law of war.78  Successes include: expanding the definitions of crimes 
against humanity and genocide to include rape; the participation of 
women in high-level positions and the inclusion of staff sensitive to 
gender issues; effectively prosecuting various forms of sexual violence 
as instruments of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
means of torture, forms of persecution, and enslavement; and gener-
ally defining, clarifying, and redressing gender-related crimes.79 
The statutes of the Tribunals essentially confirm existing princi-
ples of international criminal law and therefore reinforce customary 
law up to this point with regard to gender violence.  However, they 
were drafted cautiously to avoid nullum crimen sine lege80 issues and 
 
 75. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted by S.C. Res. 
827, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 3217th mtg., art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993), reprinted in BASIC 
DOCUMENTS OF THE ICTY (1998) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
 76. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, Annex, 
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
 77. See Niarchos, supra note 5, at 679.  As Niarchos argues, 
The prospect of rape prosecutions before the Tribunal presents something of a duality. 
On the one hand, the creation of the Tribunal reflects the best humanitarian inten-
tions. On the other, as far as women's human rights are concerned, the Tribunal begins 
its task already hampered by a long history of neglect and by legal structures that may 
be inadequate to redress the situation. 
Id. 
 78. Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 5, at 428.  In terms of the former Yugoslavia, 
The Tribunal's charter, like that of Nuremberg, is likely quickly to become a funda-
mental normative instrument of the general law of war.  The approval of the Security 
Council (Res. 827), acting under chapter VII of the UN Charter, of the tribunal's char-
ter recognizing rape as a punishable offense under international humanitarian law 
validates this important normative development and, it is hoped, may expedite the 
recognition of rape, in some circumstances, as torture or inhuman treatment in the in-
ternational law . . . . 
Id. 
 79. See ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 5, at 379; Askin, Prosecuting 
Wartime Rape, supra note 5, at 305-47; McHenry, supra note 23, at 1270-5, 1283-96. 
 80. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 139-145 (2003) (discussing 
the principle of legality of crimes, otherwise known as "nullum crimen sine lege"). 
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do not develop the law further.81  Rape is explicitly listed as a crime 
against humanity in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute and Article 3 of the 
ICTR Statute.82  This formulation follows CCL 10 and definitively es-
tablishes rape as a crime against humanity in international law.83  
Rape as such may be prosecuted separately as a crime against human-
ity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack, or 
alternatively, rape may be prosecuted as a crime against humanity as 
a constituent offence under the torture, enslavement, inhumane acts, 
or persecution provisions.84  However, the statutes fail to define rape 
as an individual crime and do not include other forms of sexual vio-
lence.85  Moreover, rape is not expressly considered as a war crime or 
a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions under either statute,86 so 
sexual violence may be prosecuted as a contributing offence but never 
as a crime on its own. 
 
 81. The jurisprudence of the Tribunals has been considerably more progressive than the 
substantive law contained within the statutes and has established an historic foundation for the 
prosecution of gender-related crimes by other international courts. For example, in the Kunarac 
judgment, wartime rape was unequivocally defined as both a crime against humanity and a war 
crime.  Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, paras. 436 (Feb. 22, 2001).  The ex-
pansion of the definition of crimes against humanity in Kunarac and the application of war 
crimes' standards to acts of rape and sexual enslavement "closed holes in the international legal 
conceptualizations of rape and enslavement, torture, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity." See id. paras. 436-57; R. McHenry III, supra note 23, at 1274. 
 82. ICTY Statute, supra note 75, art. 5(g); ICTR Statute, supra note 76, art. 3(g). Regretta-
bly, the Rwanda tribunal defines crimes against humanity "as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds," 
where gender is not included as one of the enumerated grounds.  Id. 
 83. Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 5, at 428 (arguing that the "[c]onfirmation of the 
principle stated in Control Council Law No. 10, that rape can constitute a crime against human-
ity, is, both morally and legally, of ground-breaking importance"). 
 84. The ICTY definition of crimes against humanity contains a nexus to an armed conflict, 
limiting rape prosecutions to those committed only at the time of war, ICTY Statute, supra note 
75, at art. 5, while the Rwanda Tribunal does not.  Significantly, however, the ICTY trial cham-
ber has interpreted the Geneva Conventions and their protocols to give protection to citizens in 
both international and non-international conflicts.  Id. 
 85. While in large part the ICTY has managed to overcome this by creatively interpreting 
the statute, "it clearly would have been preferable for . . . [other crimes of gender violence] to be 
identified from the outset."  Cate Steains, Gender Issues, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 362-63 (Roy 
S. Lee ed., 1999). 
 86. Including rape as a grave breach would have been an important step in providing speci-
ficity on this matter rather than leaving it up to interpretation. Further, the inclusion of rape as a 
crime against humanity, but not as a crime by itself or expressly as a war crime, means that the 
higher threshold pertaining to crimes against humanity must be met before sexual violence 
crimes can be prosecuted. Crimes against humanity are defined as "widespread and systematic," 
meaning that the isolated case of wartime rape would most likely go unpunished unless it could 
be established that it was part of a larger campaign of sexual violence.  Steains, id. 
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The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ratified 
on April 11, 2002, provides a number of important legal specifications 
with respect to the status of sexual violence in international law.87  It is 
the first international treaty to recognize a wide range of violent sex-
ual crimes among the most serious international offences and repre-
sents a significant step forward for the international community in 
combating impunity for gender-related violence.88  Significantly, the 
Rome Statute—as a widely endorsed multilateral treaty—can be 
taken to signify customary international law with respect to sexual 
violence as a war crime and crime against humanity.89  The influence 
of the Rome negotiations and the subsequent work of the Prepara-
tory Committee, as well as the virtually universal representation at 
the Rome Conference indicate that the Conference “can be taken to 
have exercised the function of an international constitutional conven-
tion on the issue of universality.”90  The ICC Statue authoritatively 
expresses the legal views of the international community as a whole, 
and thus the Statute’s innovative definitions of crimes against human-
ity and war crimes, which include sexual slavery and other forms of 
sexual violence, are not merely aspirational and can be said to repre-
sent general norms of customary international law.91 
 
 87. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 11. 
 88. While some commentators argue that the Rome Statute does not go far enough in its 
gender provisions, it must be remembered that the statute is the product of a political compro-
mise between a large number of states with very different values and ideologies. The universal 
acceptance of a gender component in the Statute, especially given the international commu-
nity's appalling record regarding crimes of sexual violence, is quite remarkable and represents 
an historic development. For a comprehensive discussion of the negotiating history of the Rome 
Statute see Steains, supra note 85, at 357-390. 
 89. Viseur-Sellers, infra note 103, at 300.  See 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INT'L LAW COMM. 248, 
para. 4 (1966) (noting that in positive legal terms, the capacity of general multilateral treaties to 
generate jus cogens norms has been established by the Convention on the Law of Treaties. The 
commentary on Article 50 of the Draft (Article 53 of the Convention) states: "a modification of 
a rule of jus cogens would today most preferably be effected through a general multilateral 
treaty"). 
 90. Weller, supra note 36, at 700-01.  Ironically, while the U.S. has been a persistent objec-
tor to the ICC Statute, it was closely involved in both the drafting of the Statute and was in-
strumental in getting many of the gender provisions included, therefore its objections "cannot, 
credibly, doubt the genuine universality of these crimes after having led their development and 
after having charged other states with them." See Weller, id. (arguing that "the negotiation 
process itself made manifest universal agreement on elements of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes as genuinely universal crimes. Instead of inventing new elements of the crimes at 
issue, the meeting translated into express and positive terms recent customary law develop-
ments in this area"). 
 91. Id. at 701 ("The U.S. itself was in fact one of the most effective and technically compe-
tent delegations in this process, both before the Rome conference, at Rome and even after-
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Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statue provides a definitive formula-
tion of crimes against humanity that includes “. . .rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”92  This list of 
crimes is also included in two separate sub-paragraphs of Article 8 
enumerating war crimes.  Importantly, Article 8 confirms that rape 
and other forms of sexual violence constitute grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions.  Specifically, the additional language “also con-
stituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions”93 and “also con-
stituting a serious violation of Article 3 common to all four Geneva 
Conventions”94 is found in relationship to gender crimes.  Technically 
speaking, the Rome Statute cannot be seen as an amendment to the 
Geneva Conventions despite the large number of signatory states.  
However, the ICC did not establish rape as a grave breach afresh in 
international law as the provision follows declarations by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), various states and schol-
ars, as well as the formal recognition by the United Nations investi-
gating commission in Rwanda that rape constitutes a grave breach of 
the conventions.95  Hence, the ICC statute effectively codifies a cus-
 
wards, when the elements of the crimes were being defined. The U.S. government has been one 
of the keenest advocates of the application of the advanced definitions of crimes against human-
ity and war crimes"). Moreover, even a persistent objector may be bound by a customary rule if 
it is of jus cogens nature. 
 92. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 7. 
 93. Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii) ("rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave 
breach of the Geneva Conventions"). 
 94. Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(e)(vi). 
 95. Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 5, at 426–27, citing ICRC, Aide-Mémoire (Dec. 3, 
1992); COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA 
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 598 
(Oscar M. Uhler & Henri Coursier eds., 1958) (noting that "as early as 1958, the ICRC Com-
mentary on the fourth Geneva Convention recognized that the grave breach of 'inhumane 
treatment' (Art. 147) should be interpreted in the context of Article 27, which also prohibits 
rape"); Letter from Robert A. Bradtke, Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to 
Senator Arlen Specter (Jan. 27, 1993) [hereinafter Robert Bradtke Letter] stating in part: 
We believe that there is no need to amend the Geneva Conventions to accomplish the 
objectives stated in your letter, however, because the legal basis for prosecuting troops 
for rape is well established under the Geneva Conventions and customary interna-
tional law . . . all parties to an international conflict (including all parties to the conflict 
in the former Yugoslavia) are required either to try persons alleged to have committed 
grave breaches or extradite them to a party that will. 
In our reports to the United Nations on human rights violations in the former Yugo-
slavia, we have reported sexual assaults as grave breaches. We will continue to do so 
and will continue to press the international community to respond to the terrible sex-
ual atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. 
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tomary law rule that rape is a grave breach.  Nonetheless, while the 
codification of rape as a grave breach is significant, leaving it to the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute and not actually amending the 
Geneva Conventions leaves the grave breach status of rape unclear 
and allows relativism on this issue when it is not allowed for other 
violent crimes.96 
Importantly, the Geneva Conventions have moved beyond their 
status as a multilateral treaty and are now recognized as customary 
international law.  As discussed above, rape is prohibited under Arti-
cle 27 of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols I and II, and 
most recently under the Rome Statute as a grave breach.  Clearly, the 
prohibition of rape enters the corpus of customary international law 
with respect to these provisions.97  Moreover, it is “uncontroversial 
that grave breaches of the conventions are also covered by genuine 
universality in customary law.”98  The recognition of rape as a grave 
breach amounts to special opinio juris because it signifies the gravity 
of the offence and triggers an unremitting obligation for states to 
prosecute or extradite violations. 
Additionally, while rape had been included as a crime against 
humanity before, the Rome Statute’s recognition of many other forms 
of sexual violence represents an important new precedent.99  It is the 
first international treaty to codify the crimes of sexual slavery, forced 
pregnancy, and gender-based persecution.100  As a constituent element 
 
The UN also formally recognized rape as a grave breach. See, e.g., Letter from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council transmitting the final report of the Commission 
of Experts, Dec. 9, 1994, para. 141, U.N. Doc. S/1405, reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
RWANDA 1993-1996 415, 430 (1996). 
 96. For instance, it is hard to imagine the U.S. claiming that "there is no need to amend the 
Geneva Convention . . . because the legal basis for prosecuting troops for rape is well estab-
lished under the Geneva Conventions and customary international law" with respect to a crime 
like torture or slavery. See, e.g., Robert Bradtke Letter. 
 97. See Steains, supra note 85, at 365 (discussing the lack of serious opposition to the inclu-
sion of gender crimes in the Rome Statute, Steains observes that "the ultimate inclusion of rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization and other forms of sexual violence as 
grave breaches and serious violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions 
proceeded smoothly, reflecting the widespread acceptance of the fact that the listing of these 
crimes was merely codifying the current state of international law"). 
 98. Weller, supra note 36, at 699. 
 99. Steains, supra note 85, at 364 ("While there were precedents for the inclusion of rape as 
a crime against humanity, the Statute's recognition of a range of sexual violence crimes, in addi-
tion to rape, under crimes against humanity creates an important new precedent"). 
 100. Id. at 357 (noting that "[t]he criminalization of these acts as war crimes represents a 
significant departure from the more restrictive approach to crimes of sexual violence in prior 
instruments"). 
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of crimes against humanity, the Statute also adds ‘gender’ as a ground 
for persecution, correcting the restrictive precedents set by the ad hoc 
Tribunals that gender-based persecution is “less prevalent—or less 
important—than persecution on the other grounds.”101 
Regrettably, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women102 is the 
only major human rights treaty that expressly lists rape as a violation 
or even mentions the word ‘rape’.103  Article 7 of the Inter-American 
Convention requires parties to punish and eradicate violence against 
women including rape.104  However, the Convention is only indicative 
of regional human rights norms governing North and South American 
signatories and does not bind the entire international community.105  
Two of the leading human rights instruments, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (UDHR)106 and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),107 have been interpreted as includ-
ing sexual violence under provisions prohibiting ‘inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment’, but both documents avoid using certain crucial lan-
guage describing rape as a violent crime committed against women on 
the basis of their gender.  The tendency for international law to use 
ambiguous language when defining sexual violence, I argue, makes 
this compromise possible.  Specifically, the failure to explicitly name 
rape as a serious violent crime on its own standing allows states to 
hedge on their international obligations and avoid clarity in docu-
ments like the UDHR and ICCPR. 
 
 101. Id. at 370. 
 102. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Vio-
lence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 27 U.S.T. 3301, General Assembly of the O.A.S., Doc. 
OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.3115/94 rev.2, reprinted in 33 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1534 (1994) [here-
inafter Inter-American Convention on Violence]. 
 103. Patricia Viseur-Sellers, Sexual Violence and Peremptory Norms: The Legal Value of 
Rape, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 287, 301 (2002) (noting that the following human rights trea-
ties fail to list rape as a violation: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant of Economic and Social 
Rights, the Convention for the Elimination and Discrimination Against Women, the Additional 
Protocol for the Convention for the Elimination and Discrimination Against Women, The Con-
vention for the Child, the Apartheid Convention, the European Convention of Human Rights, 
the African Charter of Human Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights of Man). 
 104. Inter-American Convention on Violence, supra note 102, arts. 2, 7. 
 105. Viseur-Sellers, supra note 103, at 301. 
 106. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, art. 5 (1948). 
 107. Dec. 16, 1966, art. 7, 993 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 368, 
(1967). 
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In addition to international treaties, a number of non-binding in-
ternational resolutions assert the basic importance of prohibiting sex-
ual violence.  While these instruments do not bind states to act, the 
repetition of statements through a variety of international fora articu-
lating a legal duty to prevent rape can provide evidence of a growing 
opinio juris with respect to the crime.108  The most significant of these 
is the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women adopted by the General Assembly in 1993.109  The Declara-
tion asserts that states should “[e]xercise due diligence to prevent, in-
vestigate and . . . punish acts of violence against women, whether 
those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons.”110  Simi-
larly, the Inter-American Convention on Violence provides protec-
tion against all forms of violence against women.111  The Vienna Con-
ference on Human Rights in 1993 declared “the importance of 
working towards the elimination of violence against women in public 
and private life” and stressed that “[v]iolations of the human rights of 
women in situations of armed conflict are violations of the fundamen-
tal principles of international human rights and humanitarian law.”112  
The Conference further urged states “to combat violence against 
women.”113  The monitoring body of the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) im-
parted that “gender based violence is a form of discrimination . . . 
which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.”114  Rape, particularly systematic rape in 
war, forced pregnancy, and forced abortion were also declared to be a 
 
 108. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 5, at 75; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nu-
clear Weapons para. 70, 1996 I.C.J. 226,  reprinted in 35 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 809 (1996) 
(noting that "a series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required 
for the establishment of a new rule"). 
 109. U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 104, U.N. 
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104. (1993) [hereinafter U.N. 
Declaration]. 
 110. Id. art. 4(c). 
 111. Inter-American Convention on Violence, supra note 102, art. 7. 
 112. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
June 25 1993, para. 38, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23, reprinted in 32 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 
1661(1993). 
 113. Id. 
 114. General Recommendations no. 19 Violence Against Women, C.E.D.A.W. Recommen-
dation 19, U.N. Doc. A/47/38, CEDAW/C/ 1992/L.1/Add. 15, (1992), paras. 1 and 7. 
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grave violation of human rights by the Beijing Platform for Action,115 
and similar provisions were included in the Cairo Programme of Ac-
tion.116  Finally, the U.N. Crime Commission has also adopted resolu-
tions condemning sexual violence.117  It is important to note, at this 
point, the remarkable progression of language in international law re-
garding sexual violence—from its treatment as a justifiable effect of 
war promulgated in early treaties to the establishment of the ad hoc 
Tribunals, the Rome Statute, and a number of international resolu-
tions advancing the necessary prohibition of rape as a specific tool of 
warfare.  As I have argued, rape has a unique stigma because of its 
general perception as a specifically sexual violation, which tends to 
subsume its violent nature and gravity as a gender-specific offense.  In 
these resolutions, however, sexual violence is reclassified as an indi-
vidual crime of violence with particular gender implications. 
B. The Law and Practice of Nations 
“The domestic law of every state in the world outlaws rape.”118  
Significantly, the universality of this general norm regarding the pro-
hibition of rape elucidates the existence of a widespread rule and 
practice ingrained in the legal conscience of the international com-
munity.  For instance, in Prosecutor v. Furundzija,119 the Trial Cham-
ber considered a range of national legislation in order to define rape 
 
 115. Fourth World Conference on Women, Declaration and Platform for Action, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 177/20 (1995), reprinted in 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS (1996) 401 (Bei-
jing Platform for Action), Critical Area of Concern D, paras. 112-30. 
 116. International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, UN Doc. A/CONF. 
171/13, 18 October 1994, para. 4.9. 
 117. See generally UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Draft Plan of 
Action on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, E.S.C. 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.15/1996/11 (1996) (formulating a draft resolution with priorities member states are to im-
plement to achieve the elimination of violence against women). 
 118. Viseur-Sellers, supra note 103, at 302.  See e.g., Section 361(2) of the Chilean Code, 
Código Penal del Chile, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, COD-18742 (2001); Art. 236 of the 
Chinese Penal Code (1997); Art. 177 of the German Penal Code (StGB); Art. 177 of the Japa-
nese Penal Code, translated in THE CRIMINAL CODE OF JAPAN (Thomas L. Blakemore, trans., 
1954); Art. 179 of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Penal Code; §132 of the Zam-
bian Penal Code, reprinted in 7 LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA (REVISED) 1995; Art. 201 
of the Austrian Penal Code (StGB); French Code Pénal Arts. 222-22; Art. 519 of the Italian Pe-
nal Code reprinted in 23 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, ITALIAN PENAL 
CODE (1978);. CÓD. PEN. art. 119 (Arg.).  PEN. CODE § 375 (Pak.).  PEN. CODE art. 375 (India).  
PEN. CODE § 117 (Uganda). PEN. CODE art. 242 (Neth.). CRIM. CODE ch. XXXII, art. 297 (S. 
Korea); CRIM. CODE ch. 24, art 216(1) (Den.); CRIM. CODE § 271-73 (Can.); CRIMES ACT OF 
1961 § 128 (N.Z); CÓD. PEN. art. 195 (Nicar.). 
 119. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T (Dec. 10, 1998). 
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and found that “in spite of inevitable discrepancies, most legal sys-
tems in the common and civil law worlds consider rape to be the 
forcible sexual penetration of the human body by the penis or the 
forcible insertion of any other object into either the vagina or the 
anus.”120  Implicit in this statement is that most legal systems in the 
common and civil law worlds prohibit rape,121 and more importantly, 
this prohibition clarifies a common underlying principle that substan-
tiates a legal and moral duty undertaken by states to penalize serious 
violations of sexual autonomy.122  As Judge Patricia Viseur-Sellers 
states, “unmistakably, there is a general norm of international law de-
 
 120. Id. at para. 181.  See also Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A-R77, para. 15 (Jan. 31, 2000) 
("It is otherwise of assistance to look to the general principles of law common to the major legal 
systems of the world, as developed and refined (where applicable) in international jurispru-
dence").  When it is not possible to discern an international legal rule from international trea-
ties, custom or general principles, international courts may resort to general principles of law 
common in national legal systems if they are able to disclose a common indicator of interna-
tional law on the subject. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 31, at 25 (holding that: 
"[g]eneral principles common to the major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in 
customary law or international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary rules of interna-
tional law where appropriate"). 
 121. To be sure, domestic law regarding rape is not without problems; it is often biased or 
inadequate and even where laws are not discriminatory, they may be applied differently to 
women by the legal system or so flawed that they fail to protect women from violence. Further-
more, even when a sufficient legal framework is in place, authorities may fail to implement it. 
See Contemporary Slavery, supra note 20, at para. 96. 
A general survey of municipal legal systems reveals the following examples of gender-
based discrimination codified in criminal laws and justice systems around the world: 
rape and other forms of sexual assaults that are defined as crimes against the commu-
nity and not against the individual victim, even though non-sexual assaults are defined 
as crimes against the individual victim; rape being defined as acts committed by a man 
against a woman (not his wife), even though men are also victims of sexual violence; 
procedural laws requiring women to take independent action to initiate prosecutions 
of rape by the prosecutor's office; evidentiary laws which accord less weight to evi-
dence if presented by a woman; evidentiary laws in rape and sexual assault cases which 
require women to provide corroborating testimony from men; substantive laws which 
provide that a married woman who is unsuccessful in proving that she was raped can 
then be charged with adultery; penalties for sexual violence which allow a man con-
victed of rape to avoid punishment if he marries the victim; laws which prevent women 
from serving as judges or as fact-finders; laws which restrict women's access to abor-
tions, contraception or reproductive information; and the absence of adequate, gender-
specific witness protection programmes—leaving survivors of sexual and gender vio-
lence vulnerable to retaliatory attacks and at the mercy of their male relatives for pro-
tection—the very relatives who often regard the survivors as "dishonoured women." 
Id. 
 122. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, paras. 436-50, 457 (Feb. 22, 
2001) (noting that "[t]he basic principle which is truly common to these legal systems is that se-
rious violations of sexual autonomy are to be penalized.  Sexual autonomy is violated wherever 
the person subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it or otherwise is not a voluntary partici-
pant"). 
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rived from municipal law regarding the illegality of rape.”123  The ca-
veat, however, is that such a norm only binds each state to its own law 
and does not produce an international legal effect governing the pro-
hibition of rape for the entire international community and therefore 
does not translate directly into a peremptory norm in and of itself—
although it certainly illuminates a specific legal attitude that rape is a 
violation of jus cogens character and thereby creates an objective ob-
ligation requiring all states to observe the norm as an essential com-
ponent to the existence of the international legal order.124 
Two recent domestic cases redressing international gender 
crimes, Kadic v. Karadzic125 and Hwang Geum Joo, et al. v. Japan,126 
pronounced on the legal value of rape and implicitly confirmed its jus 
cogens character.  In Kadic v. Karadzic—a claim brought against 
Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic by plaintiffs representing citi-
zens of the former Yugoslavia under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA)127—Croat and Muslim Bosnian women filed tort actions al-
leging various atrocities, including “brutal acts of rape, forced prosti-
tution, forced impregnation, torture, and summary execution.”128  The 
case extended the exercise of civil jurisdiction by U.S. courts to cover 
acts of sexual violence to the extent that they are committed in pur-
suit of genocide or war crimes, regardless of the location of the crimes 
or the nationality of the victims or the accused.129  In its judgment, the 
Second Circuit Court recognized that “acts of murder, rape, torture, 
and arbitrary detention (slavery) have long been recognized as viola-
tions of ‘the most fundamental norms of the law of war’ and direct 
 
 123. Viseur-Sellers, supra note 103, at 296, 302 (noting generally her counter-argument that 
"the community of states has not expressed a more poignant interest in accepting prohibition of 
rape, in and of itself, as a peremptory norm . . . states still do not 'act obligated' in the face of 
present day massive trafficking of eastern European women or Asian women throughout 
Europe, that is essentially institutionalized rape"). 
 124. Importantly, however, the derivation of international law from domestic legal systems 
"presupposes a process of identification of the common denominators in these legal systems so 
as to pinpoint the basic notions they share," Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1-T, 73, at 
para. 74. 
 125. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 126. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 127. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.  See generally Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien 
Tort Statute And The Judiciary Act Of 1789: A Badge Of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989) 
(discussing the Alien Tort Claims Act). 
 128. Kadic, 70 F. 3d at 232, 236-37 (noting the importance of sexual violence in the alleged 
acts). 
 129. Id. at 243-43.  Such jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act was first established in 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,  630 F. 2d 876, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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violations of international law.”130  To be sure, the Court’s decision 
does not directly address questions of jus cogens, but it does validate 
victims’ accounts of the violent sexual crimes committed against them 
as grave violations of the law of war and importantly shows the effects 
of a jus cogens norm through opinio juris.131  Specifically, by making 
such claims actionable in U.S. courts, Kadic confirms a non-derogable 
legal obligation to civilly prosecute such cases and establishes the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over sexual violence as a universal crime. 
In Hwang Geum Joo, a class action complaint on behalf of fifteen 
Asian women filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, plaintiffs alleged that along with approximately 200,000 other 
women and girls they were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese 
military during World War II.132 These “comfort women” were “re-
peatedly raped—often by as many as thirty or forty men a day—
tortured, beaten, mutilated, and sometimes murdered.”133  The plain-
tiffs and their counsel argued that Japan’s abduction and forced sex-
ual enslavement of thousands of women violates jus cogens principles 
and that this should constitute an implied waiver of sovereign immu-
nity.134  Although the Court did not specifically rule on the jus cogens 
status of sexual slavery, the Court’s decision appears to have turned 
on the view that the acts in question were a violation of jus cogens.  In 
 
 130. Memorandum Complaint, infra note 132, at 40, citing Kadic, 70 F. 3d at 243. 
 131. Civil jurisdiction cannot result in any punishment, but the hearing of such cases con-
firms the seriousness of the alleged crimes and may eventually be used to criminally punish of-
fenders in extreme cases. Similar actions have also been filed against corporations and their ex-
ecutives for violations of human rights, including rape.  See generally, John Doe I v. Unocal 
Corp., 395 F 3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (alleging the Myanmar government and government owned 
oil company, a French oil company, and an American oil company committed human rights vio-
lations).  See generally RECENT CASE: Civil Procedure - Choice of Law - Ninth Circuit Uses In-
ternational Law To Decide Applicable Substantive Law Under Alien Tort Claims Act, 116 
HARVARD LAW REV. 1525 (2003) (discussing John Doe I v. Unocal Corp. case in relations to 
the Alien Tort Claims Act).  See also Craig Forcese, ATCA's Achilles Heel: Corporate Complic-
ity, International Law and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 487 (2001) (discussing 
the Alien Tort Claim's Act). 
 132. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Declara-
tory Judgment That Japan Cannot Claim Sovereign Immunity in Defense of Claims of System-
atic Sexual Slavery During World War II, Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 
(D.D.C. 2001) (No. 00-CV-2288, renumbered 00-CV-2233) at 1 [hereinafter Memorandum 
Complaint], available at http://www.cmht.com/pdfs/comfortwomen2.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 
2005) (submitted by Michael D. Hausfeld and Agnieszka M. Fryszman of Cohen, Milstein, 
Hausfeld & Toll, PLLC on behalf of fifteen Asian women). 
 133. Hwang Geum Joo, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 52, 55. 
 134. Memorandum Complaint, supra note 132, at 38-45 (the plaintiffs argued that "the ac-
tions of Japan in forcing hundreds of thousands of women into military sexual slavery violates 
jus cogens principles of international law, which are not subject to sovereign immunity"). 
MITCHELL_FMT1_1.DOC 9/15/2005  10:09 AM 
2005] THE PROHIBITION OF RAPE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 251 
the Trial Chamber’s memorandum opinion, Judge Henry H. Ken-
nedy, Jr., writes: “In light of the binding precedent of the D.C. Circuit 
in Princz, the court concludes that Japan’s jus cogens violations do 
not constitute an implied waiver under § 1605(a)(1).”135  Here, the 
Court acts as if sexual violence violates jus cogens, which in turn sug-
gests that the illegality of sexual violence constitutes an existing jus 
cogens norm.  The Court’s pronouncement condemns the alleged acts 
as being among “the worst atrocities ever committed by mankind”136 
and clearly asserts sexual slavery as a peremptory norm. 
Both of these cases provide implicit confirmation that the inter-
national disapproval of violent sexual acts is so fundamental and so 
compelling that the prohibition amounts to a jus cogens rule.  It is 
evident from domestic law and practice that the illegality of rape es-
tablishes a general norm of international law.  Nonetheless, that gen-
eral norm only binds each state to its own law and does not translate 
into a peremptory norm by itself.137  At this stage, however, I would 
like to point out that the weight of domestic practice opposing rape, 
both uniform and expressive of an objective legal obligation, reflects 
the fundamental interests of the international public order and pro-
vides further justification for asserting that this prohibition is of a 
peremptory nature. 
C. Decisions of International and Regional Judicial Bodies 
Uniquely, rape is a constituent element of every accepted jus co-
gens norm.  Under the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals and re-
gional human rights courts, rape has been characterized and prose-
cuted as a component of genocide, torture, slavery, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.  It is important to note that the seriousness 
of violent sexual crime requisites treatment and consequences beyond 
‘lesser’ crimes of war such that when violations occur these crimes are 
accounted for and characterized as elements of other jus cogens 
norms as particularly grave violations of international law. 
 
 135. Hwang Geum Joo, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 61 (holding that jus cogens violations do not con-
stitute an implied waiver). 
 136. Id. at 55. 
 137. Viseur-Sellers, supra note 103, at 302 (noting that "[m]unicipal law does not 'act' to 
protect the overriding interest of the international community in relation to the prohibition of 
rape.  Hence, even the widely recognized municipal-derived general norm regarding rape does 
not translate into a peremptory norm"). 
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First, rape has been found by several international judicial bodies 
to constitute the elements of torture.138  At the regional level, Aydin v. 
Turkey139 and Mejia Egocheaga v. Peru,140 both issued decisions inter-
preting rape as an act of torture.  In Mejia, the Inter-American Com-
mission of Human Rights ruled that the rape of Raquel Mejia by 
members of the Peruvian Army constituted torture in breach of the 
Geneva Conventions and Article 5 of the Inter-American Conven-
tion.141  In Aydin, the European Court of Human Rights interpreted 
rape as an act of torture under Article 3 of the European Conven-
tion142 and “specifically affirmed the view that rape involves the inflic-
tion of suffering at a requisite level of severity to place it in the cate-
gory of torture.”143  Rape was also characterized as an act of torture 
under the jurisprudence of the Yugoslav Tribunal.  In the Celebici 
case, the Trial Chamber held that mass rapes at a Muslim-run deten-
tion center where Serbian men and women were sexually assaulted 
constituted acts of torture,144 and both Prosecutor v. Kunarac145 and 
 
 138. In addition to the noted judgments, the United Nations Special Rapporteur also ex-
presses the view that rape constitutes torture, whose report lists various forms of sexual violence 
as methods of torture.  See Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form 
of Detention or Imprisonment, In Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment; Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pur-
suant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1992/32, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human 
Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 10(a), at para. 16, 25 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/34 (1995). 
 139. Aydin v. Turkey (1997) 3 Butterworths Human Rights Cases 300. 
 140. Mejia Egocheaga v. Peru (1996) 1 Butterworths Human Rights Cases 229. 
 141. Id. at 263. 
 142. Aydin, 3 Butterworths Human Rights Cases 300, at 314. The Akayesu case referred to 
rape as torture in the following terms: 
Like torture rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, 
discrimination, punishment control or destruction of a person. Like torture rape is a 
violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other per-
son acting in an official capacity. 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu,  ICTR-96-4-T, para. 687 (2 Sept. 1998). 
 143. Prosecutor v. Delalic, IT-96-21-T, para. 489 (Nov. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Celebici]. 
 144. Id., at para. 495-496. The court also indicated the gravity of sexual violence and rape as 
an individual offense, stating that it "considers the rape of any person to be a despicable act 
which strikes at the very core of human dignity and physical integrity." Id. (emphasis added).  
The court further stated: 
Rape causes severe pain and suffering, both physical and psychological. The psycho-
logical suffering of persons upon whom rape is inflicted may be exacerbated by social 
and cultural conditions and can be particularly acute and long lasting. Furthermore, it 
is difficult to envisage circumstances in which rape, by, or at the instigation of a public 
official, or with the consent or acquiescence of an official, could be considered as oc-
curring for a purpose that does not, in some way, involve punishment, coercion, dis-
crimination or intimidation. In the view of this Trial Chamber this is inherent in situa-
tions of armed conflict. Accordingly, whenever rape and other forms of sexual violence 
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Prosecutor v. Furundzija upheld convictions that in certain circum-
stances “rape can amount to torture” as a violation of international 
law.146 
Similarly, sexual violence has been proven to satisfy genocidal 
conduct under the jurisprudence of the Rwandan Tribunal in Prose-
cutor v. Akayesu.147  Specifically, the Trial Chamber found that sexual 
violence and rape were committed with requisite genocidal intent 
such that “rape and sexual violence . . . constitute genocide in the 
same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the 
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group.”148  
The Trial Chamber also notes that rape and sexual violence were an 
integral part of the process of destroying the Tutsi population and 
amount to one of the worst ways to inflict injury on the victim be-
cause of the combination of physical and psychological harm.149 
 
meet the aforementioned criteria, they shall constitute torture, in the same manner as 
any other acts that meet this criteria. 
Id. (emphasis added).  In the italicized statement, the Trial Chamber clearly evinces opinio ju-
ris—a perceived legal obligation—as the expression of jus cogens effects. 
 145. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, para. 557 (Feb. 22, 2001) ("the 
Judgment"), and paras. 179-185 (June 12, 2002) ("the Appeal") (the Appeals Chamber noting 
that "[t]he physical pain, fear, anguish, uncertainty and humiliation to which the Appellants re-
peatedly subjected their victims elevate their acts to those of torture . . . the deliberate and co-
ordinated commission of rapes was carried out with breathtaking impunity over a long period of 
time . . . the victims endured repeated rapes, implicating not only the offence of rape but also 
that of torture under Article 5 of the Statute"). Id. at para. 185. 
 146. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 73, at paras. 163-189; see also Prosecutor v. 
Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1-A, para. 210 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ 
furundzija/appeal/judgement/index.htm.  Additionally, Furundzija expressed the universal 
character of sexual violence as a serious offense from which no derogation is permitted, stating 
that "the prohibition of rape and serious sexual assault has evolved in customary international 
law . . . [into] universally accepted norms of international law prohibiting rape and serious 
sexual assault . . . applicable in any armed conflict."  Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1-T, 73, at para. 
168-169.  Furthermore, the Trial Chamber expressed the legal duty for states to prosecute these 
crimes when they occur in armed conflict: "It is indisputable that rape and other serious sexual 
assaults in armed conflict entail the criminal liability of the perpetrators." Furundzija, No. IT-
95-17/1-T, 73, at para. 168-169. 
 147. Prosecutor v. Akayesu,  ICTR-96-4-T, paras. 507-08, 731 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 148. Id. at para. 731. 
 149. Id.  The court went on to describe the rapes against Tutsi women: 
The rape of Tutsi women was systematic and was perpetrated against all Tutsi women 
and solely against them. A Tutsi woman, married to a Hutu, testified before the 
Chamber that she was not raped because her ethnic background was unknown. As part 
of the propaganda campaign geared to mobilizing the Hutu against the Tutsi, the Tutsi 
women were presented as sexual objects. Indeed, the Chamber was told, for an exam-
ple, that before being raped and killed, Alexia, who was the wife of the Professor, 
Ntereye, and her two nieces, were forced by Interahamwe to undress and ordered to 
run and do exercises 'in order to display the thighs of the Tutsi women.' The Intera-
hamwe who raped Alexia said, as he threw her on the ground and got on top of her, 
'let us see what the vagina of a Tutsi woman tastes like.' As stated above, Akayesu 
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Finally, it has been demonstrated that rape and sexual violence 
are forms of slavery.150  Under the Yugoslav Tribunal, the Kunarac 
judgment was the first to ever prosecute rape as enslavement.151  In 
addition, a recent report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
specified that “in all respects and in all circumstances, sexual slavery 
is slavery and its prohibition is a jus cogens norm.”152 
Thus, rape can be characterized and prosecuted as jus cogens 
when it fulfills the requisite elements proving torture, genocide, slav-
ery, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.153  Significantly, the in-
clusion of rape as a component of every other peremptory norm re-
flects the expression of a legal obligation and therefore articulates 
opinio juris.  However, while it is important to applaud this jurispru-
dence and note how it has helped to illuminate ways in which these 
offences are committed uniquely through rape, the failure to define 
rape as a separate jus cogens violation ignores the seriousness of rape 
as an international problem on its own and allows states to treat sex-
ual violence as a ‘softer’ offense than other peremptory norms.154 
Lastly, a number of U.N. General Assembly and Security Coun-
cil Resolutions have strongly condemned sexual violence regarding 
atrocities in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, East 
Timor, Japan, Haiti, Myanmar (Burma), and Afghanistan.155  The col-
 
himself, speaking to the Interahamwe who were committing the rapes, said to them: 
'don't ever ask again what a Tutsi woman tastes like.' This sexualized representation of 
ethnic identity graphically illustrates that the Tutsi women were subjected to sexual 
violence because they were Tutsi. Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruc-
tion of the Tutsi group—destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself. 
Id. at para. 732 (emphasis added). 
 150. See Contemporary Slavery, supra note 20, at para. 30 (noting that "the 'comfort sta-
tions' that were maintained by the Japanese military during the Second World War . . . and the 
'rape camps' that have been well documented in the former Yugoslavia are particularly egre-
gious examples of sexual slavery"). 
 151. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, at para. 186 (June 12, 2002) ("the 
Appeal"). 
 152. Contemporary Slavery, supra note 20, at para. 30. 
 153. Rape and various forms of sexual violence are elements of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court. See Rome Statute, supra note 22, 
at articles 7, 8. 
 154. Viseur-Sellers, supra note 103, at 296 (noting how "the result is a form of legal piggy-
backing. Prohibitions of sexual violence do not rise on their own volition, but enters [sic] by way 
of a non-explicit sexual crime, to reach the glory of jus cogens"). The lack of explicit legal force 
behind rape as an independent peremptory norm permits rape to be interpreted by states in 
'soft' ways that are not allowed with respect to other peremptory norms.  Consequently, states 
can hedge on their international obligations and downplay the severity of violent sexual of-
fenses. 
 155. S.C. Res. 798, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3150th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/798 (1992) 
(strongly condemning "reports of massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of 
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lective force of these resolutions responding to violations that have 
occurred validates the important normative development of rape as a 
peremptory norm.  To be sure, U.N. Resolutions are not legally bind-
ing and remain subject to political pressure; however, such documents 
play an important role in providing a general context for international 
interests as an indicator of consensus on international issues. 
For example, Security Council Resolution 798, pursuant to the 
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, states that the Council was “ap-
palled by reports of the massive, organized and systematic detention 
and rape of women . . . [and] strongly condemns these acts of un-
speakable brutality.”156 Following this resolution, the General Assem-
bly expressed its desire “of ensuring that persons accused of uphold-
ing and perpetrating rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war . . . 
be brought to justice . . . without further delay.”157  Furthermore, Se-
curity Council Resolution 1325, the first ever Security Council Reso-
lution specifically regarding violence against women, “[c]alls on all 
parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women 
and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other 
forms of sexual abuses” and “emphasizes the responsibility of all 
States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible 
for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those 
relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls.”158 
 
women" in Bosnia and Herzegovina); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3200th mtg. at 2, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (1993) (condemning detention and rape of women in Bosnia and Herze-
govina and affirming individual responsibility for those responsible for committing or ordering 
such acts); G.A. Res. 49/205, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 94th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/205 
(1994) ("Appalled at the continuing and substantiated reports of widespread rape and abuse of 
women and children in the areas of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia"); G.A. Res. 
48/143, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/143 (1993) (discussing rape and 
abuse of women in the Yugoslav conflict); Rape and Abuse of Women in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 27,  U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1993/L.3 (1993) (condemning sexual violence of women during Yugoslav conflict); S.C. 
Res. 917, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., 3376th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/917 (1994) ("Strongly con-
demning the numerous instances of . . . rape and enforced disappearances" in Haiti); S.C. Res. 
1076, U.N. SCOR 51st Sess., 3706th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1076 (1996) ("Denounces the 
discrimination against girls and women and other violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law in Afghanistan"). 
 156. S.C. Res. 798, supra note 155. 
 157. G.A. Res. 49/205, supra note 155. 
 158. S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4213th mtg., at 1, 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1325 
(2000) ("reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts 
and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full in-
volvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need 
to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution"). 
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As an international forum representing the community of states, 
U.N. General Assembly Resolutions suggest state opinion about in-
ternational law and Security Council Resolutions reflect the interna-
tional community’s gravest concerns.  Taken together, the corpus of 
U.N. Resolutions indicates the erga omnes effects of an existing per-
emptory norm.  Put differently, the international community is aware 
of the overriding importance of prohibiting sexual violence and as a 
result of its especially grave character this obligation is expressed as 
non-derogable and essential for the maintenance of the international 
public order.  Unmistakably, the proliferation of General Assembly 
and Security Council pronouncements condemning sexual violence 
indicates an international obligation to denounce such acts and there-
fore identifies opinio juris supporting the prohibition of rape—at least 
during armed conflict—as a customary rule. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Undeniably, the prohibition of rape as a crime in international 
humanitarian law possesses the character of jus cogens.  As argued 
above, a general norm prohibiting rape satisfies the basic sources of 
international law—treaty, custom, and general principles—as well as 
the objective indicia put forth by the ILC.159  First, the norm is prohib-
ited from derogation in a large number of normative multilateral 
agreements.  Second, the municipal law of every nation in the world 
outlaws rape as part of general custom and rape is frequently con-
demned in the practice of most nations as an obligatory rule of higher 
international standing.160  Finally, international courts, regional tribu-
nals, and the U.N. Security Council have recognized and applied this 
protective concept as a jus cogens rule. 
Growing consensus confirms that the interest of the international 
community in prohibiting rape is, both morally and legally, a value so 
basic and fundamental to the international public order that this pro-
hibition has acquired the status of jus cogens.161  The most immediate 
 
 159. See supra, Part II. 
 160. See supra, Part III, Section B. 
 161. See Statement by Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights before the Beijing+5 Review Conference, (2000) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
huricane/huricane.nsf/424e6fc8b8e55fa6802566b0004083d9/db6643258a4cc97f802568fd005b10ba
?OpenDocument 
 ("When we speak of violations of humanitarian law, when we speak of crimes which are so ab-
horrent that they are considered jus cogens under international law . . .  and when we consider 
the particular way that these crimes can be committed against women, there is no room for ne-
gotiation nor derogation from international legal obligation"); see also Askin, Prosecuting War-
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challenge is to recognize this emerging norm by clarifying the legal 
language surrounding rape and formally defining it in practice as a 
peremptory norm.  This realization will require self-awareness among 
judges and recognition by lawyers and lawmakers that the legal value 
of rape has emerged as a basic standard of the international public 
order. Given that the prevalence of sexual violence in international 
law is equally matched by the tendency not to adjudicate,162 the asser-
tion of an inviolable peremptory norm prohibiting rape will be an im-
portant step toward increasing normative compliance, state responsi-
bility, and effective prosecution.163  By developing the legal capacity to 
prosecute rape as a serious violation independently from other per-
emptory norms, states will be compelled to recognize and act on their 
obligation to pursue those responsible, which will help to ensure ac-
countability and deter future violations.164  After centuries of disre-
gard, it is time to firmly establish an inderogable protection against 
rape as a high level constitutional principle of the international legal 
system. 
 
time Rape, supra note 5, at 349 ("It has taken over twenty-one centuries to acknowledge sex 
crimes as one of the most serious types of crimes committable, but it appears that this recogni-
tion has finally dawned"). 
 162. The continued oppression, discrimination, and sexual violence perpetrated against 
women is a worldwide phenomenon and constitutes "one of those rare [international law] areas 
where there is genuinely consistent and uniform state practice." See Charlesworth & Chinkin, 
The Gender of Jus Cogens, supra note 16, at 71.  Amnesty International recently declared that 
"[v]iolence against women is the greatest human rights scandal of our times."  See e.g., Amnesty 
International, It's in Our Hands, supra note 26, at 1 (declaring that "from birth to death, in 
times of peace as well as war, women face discrimination and violence at the hands of the state, 
the community and the family . . .  violence against women is not confined to any particular po-
litical or economic system, but is prevalent in every society in the world and cuts across bounda-
ries of wealth, race and culture"). 
 163. See generally, supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting failure of the international 
community to effectively prosecute crimes of rape and sexual violence). 
 164. Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 5, at 428 (noting that "[m]eaningful progress in 
combating rape can only be made by more vigorous enforcement of the law"). 
